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On the morning of July 10, 1882, a young prostitute named Theresa Sturla murdered her 
lover, Charles Stiles, on the sixth floor of the Palmer House in Chicago. During her trial four 
months later, Sturla’s attorney employed a dual argument of self-defense and insanity. He 
claimed that his client suffered from dysmenorrhea, or painful menstruation, and that she had 
gone temporarily insane at the time of the murder due to her defective reproductive system. 
According to the defense, Stiles’ abuse toward his mistress had exacerbated the disease and her 
only solution was to respond with violence. After a month-long trial, Sturla received a verdict 
of manslaughter and a one-year prison sentence. The murder and subsequent trial was a media 
sensation and ultimately came to embody a crisis of class and morals that was brewing in 
Chicago on the eve of the Progressive Era. Sturla’s story reveals that it was possible for a fallen 
woman to slay an abusive lover and, with the help of a skilled defense attorney, manipulate 
common notions of woman’s nature in order to garner sympathy from a male jury. The jury’s 
verdict and the opinions expressed in the Chicago media indicated that the majority of the 
public had faith that middle-class principles and Christian morality would prevail. The tragedy 
of Theresa Sturla also demonstrates the relative plasticity of the Victorian ideal of true 
womanhood, showing that upward social mobility was not out of reach for a “fallen woman.” 
However, the road to respectability for a woman like Sturla was paved in the blood of her 
abuser. By using this case as a lens, we might better understand the connections between 
womanhood, female sexuality, violence, and perceptions of insanity and morality in nineteenth-
century America. 
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INTRODUCTION: “THIS IS HOW I CAME TO KILL HIM” 
On a summer evening in 1882, a caller at the Chicago Board of Trade named Charles 
Stiles hired a horse and buggy from a stable on Wabash Avenue. He proceeded to pick up his 
mistress, Theresa Sturla, and the couple drove to Downing’s roadhouse on the city’s north side. 
Spending several hours drinking, dining, and playfully teasing each other, Stiles eventually told 
his lover that he required $500 in order to settle some of his gambling debts, but Sturla 
repeatedly told him that she did not have the money. Stiles angrily grabbed her by the throat and 
threatened her life if she did not somehow produce what he needed. After the violent exchange 
Stiles ordered the horses and abandoned Theresa at the restaurant, leaving her to walk several 
miles home in a thunderstorm.1 Early the following morning, on July 10, 1882, a boarder on the 
sixth floor of Chicago’s famous Palmer House was awoken by Stiles’ voice crying, “Murder! 
Murder!” By seven o’clock Stiles lay dead in the open doorway of room 661, fatally wounded by 
a gunshot to the chest. Witnesses later testified that just after Stiles died, Sturla sat bent over his 
corpse brushing his hair back and kissing his face, saying, “I told him I would do it, and I have 
done it. I have done it and I am glad of it; let the law take its course, and I don’t care if I swing 
for it.”2  
Having only observed the aftermath of the murder, none of the boarders on the sixth floor 
actually witnessed the quarrel that preceded Stiles’ death, making Sturla the only living person 
who knew the truth of what happened in room 661. After police questioning, reporters from the 
Chicago Tribune, Chicago Times, and Daily Inter Ocean immediately interviewed Chicago’s 
newest murderess. “This is how I came to kill him,” she said as she began her story for the 
Times. Following the incident at Downing’s, Sturla “determined then never to have any more to 
                                                
1 O.E. Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy (Chicago: O.E. Hammond, 1883), 166. 
2 Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 101. 
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do with him” and claimed that she went to the Palmer House with the intention of saying good-
bye to Stiles for the last time. When she asked for “just one kiss for the old love’s sake,” Stiles 
threatened to kill her, pushed her to the ground and kicked her in the side. When she stood up, he 
grabbed her neck—“a favorite trick of his.” In his grasp, Theresa pulled out her pistol and 
warned him that it might go off. Before she knew it the shot was fired. In her multiple recitations 
of the story, Sturla maintained that she had no memory of the time between when the first shot 
was fired and when she was taken to Cook County jail. She remained in custody for the next four 
months awaiting her trial where she faced capital punishment.3 
The murder could seemingly be justified as a case of self-defense, which was indeed the 
first piece of the two-pronged defense that Sturla’s attorney employed during the trial. The other 
key argument was that Sturla had become temporarily insane at the time that she killed Stiles. 
According to her attorney, A.S. Trude, Sturla’s paroxysmal insanity was a direct result of 
dysmenorrhea, or painful menstruation. He argued that the violence Sturla endured at the hand of 
her lover had exacerbated her disease, which made her prone to brief losses of sanity while 
menstruating. Throughout the twenty-day trial, numerous character witnesses attested to both 
Stiles’ abusive behavior and Sturla’s alleged insanity. Additionally, over a dozen different 
physicians were called in as expert witnesses and confirmed for the court that the abuse Sturla 
endured was the fundamental factor in a sudden onset of insanity that caused her to kill Stiles. 
On December 18, 1882, in a packed courtroom, Theresa Sturla received a compromised verdict 
of manslaughter with the punishment of one year in prison. 
The trial of Theresa Sturla is captivating as a tale of true crime and Victorian-era 
sensationalism, but its overall historical significance is greater than the titillation it provided 
Chicagoans in the winter of 1882. Sturla’s story also provokes a number of important historical 
                                                
3 Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 49-53. 
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questions: What is the significance of Sturla’s use of the insanity defense founded on the idea of 
dysfunctional female biology in a capital murder case? What is the correlation between insanity 
induced by dysmenorrhea and potential moral vindication for the defendant? How were 
Victorian notions of true womanhood and virtue applied to murderesses? How did flagrant 
domestic abuse, the “unwritten law,” and middle-class values factor in to the public perceptions 
of both Sturla and Stiles? What did a legal acceptance of revenge mean for fallen women, i.e. 
prostitutes, at the time? Were prostitutes afforded the opportunity for upward social mobility, or 
were they considered irredeemable once they became a despoiled maiden?  
By using this case and other dysmenorrheal insanity cases as a lens, we might better 
understand the connections between womanhood, female sexuality, violence, and perceptions of 
insanity in Victorian America. In the nineteenth century, it was generally believed that insanity 
among women was derivative of an inherent feminine condition of emotional instability. Sturla’s 
story reveals that it was possible for a fallen woman to slay an abusive lover and, with the help of 
a skilled defense attorney, manipulate common notions of woman’s nature in order to garner 
sympathy from the male jury. Despite entering her trial as a fallen angel who had murdered a 
well-respected man, Theresa Sturla’s singular display of agency—the killing of the libertine who 
seduced and abused her—directly led to the opportunity for moral and social redemption. This 
allowed for the defendant not only to literally get away with murder but also improve her 
prospect of realizing the Victorian ideal of true womanhood. Indeed the case demonstrates the 
relative plasticity of the ideal of true womanhood. As an immigrant and member of the lower 
class, Sturla’s involvement with Stiles represented her aspirations of respectability. After the 
murder, the public conversation centered on whether Sturla could change her ways and become a 
respectable woman. Although there were skeptics, the jury’s verdict and overall opinion 
4 
expressed in the press indicates that Sturla’s supporters, especially in Chicago, had faith that 
middle-class principles and Christian morality would prevail, providing an avenue for her to 
become a “true woman.” 
Prior to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the ideal woman was a model of 
womanhood known as the perfect wife. The perfect wife was an active participant in the family 
whose most important task was childbearing. At the dawn of the Victorian era, this model gave 
way to the perfect lady, an ideal that was most fully developed in the upper middle class. In her 
perfect form, “the lady combined total sexual innocence, conspicuous consumption and the 
worship of the family hearth.”4 As Martha Vicinus noted in 1972, “economic and social 
circumstances made it impossible for the working-class woman to attain the ideal of the perfect 
lady.”5 However, Sturla’s case illustrates how a woman might approximate the nineteenth 
century ideal of true womanhood. 
The Cult of True Womanhood was the centerpiece of nineteenth-century female identity. 
Although True Womanhood was the ideal, according to Barbara Welter, it was also a “fearful 
obligation, a solemn responsibility” that women had, to “uphold the pillars of the temple with her 
frail white hand.”6 Victorian women were believed to be “inherently more religious, modest, 
passive, submissive and domestic than men.”7 A woman judged herself and was judged by her 
husband, neighbors, and society based on her ability to uphold the four cardinal virtues of True 
                                                
4 Martha Vicinus, Suffer and Be Still: Women in the Victorian Age (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1972), ix. 
5 Vicinus, Suffer and Be Still, xii. 
6 Barbara Welter, “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860,” American Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Summer 
1966), 151-174. Welter introduced the concept of True Womanhood in 1966, which became foundational 
in understanding the place of women in Victorian society. 
7 Barbara Welter, Dimity Convictions: The American Woman in the Nineteenth Century (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1976), 4. 
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Womanhood—piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity.8 She was also expected to support 
the men in her life by helping them to overcome any of their moral imperfections. In turn, men 
“subscribed to the belief in woman’s moral superiority and the double standard.”9 A virtuous 
girl’s greatest assets were her innocent spirit and, even more importantly, her physical virginity.  
As a poor immigrant who began working as a prostitute in Baltimore at the age of 15, 
Theresa Sturla was never part the middle class. Nevertheless, she certainly admired the ideal. 
When she first met Stiles he convinced her to leave her home and run away with him back to his 
hometown of Chicago, promising they would be wed and she would never have to disgrace 
herself by working in disorderly houses again. Like most girls of her time, Sturla likely felt that 
marrying a well-to-do man such as Stiles would be a demonstrable step up in the social hierarchy 
and an automatic source of happiness. However, given the fact that Stiles was well aware of 
Sturla’s past, he almost certainly did not value her for her virtue and it is questionable that he 
ever truly intended to marry her.10 Sturla’s biggest flaw as a woman was that she lacked purity, 
the absence of which was considered unnatural and unfeminine. Without it, a woman like Sturla 
was no woman at all, but a member of some lower order: “A ‘fallen woman’…unworthy of the 
celestial company of her sex,” as Barbara Welter put it.11 Sturla believed that becoming involved 
with Stiles would allow her to leave her old life behind and join respectable society. In turn, she 
would be socially redeemed and allowed to finally realize the aspirational ideal of true 
womanhood. However, Stiles’ mistreatment of her throughout their relationship stopped her 
from breaking out of her status as a fallen woman. The model of true womanhood highlights the 
notion that to be guilty of the crime of impurity could bring madness or death but does not 
                                                
8 Welter, “The Cult of True Womanhood,” 152. 
9 Welter, Dimity Convictions, 5; Mary Louise Roberts, “True Womanhood Revisited,” Journal of 
Women’s History 14, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 150. 
10 Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 42-49. 
11 Welter, Dimity Convictions, 23. 
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address how a fallen woman might restore her virtue. The Sturla trial indicates that at least one 
avenue to redemption began with ridding oneself of the libertine responsible for a woman’s fall 
from grace. 
According to the Victorian ideal, women who abandoned virtue had no place in middle-
class society and were generally cast as sirens of vice. After 1830, however, evangelical women 
in American cities began forming voluntary societies that were intended to care for these lost, 
fallen angels. These female moral reformers cast prostitutes not as irredeemable harlots, but 
rather as their own fallen sisters who were themselves victims of the sexual and legal double 
standards pervasive in urban society. The defense of these “deviant” females was born out of 
hostility toward licentious men and the social order that allowed them to oppress women with 
impunity. Prostitutes themselves became a metaphor of the oppression of all women, selling their 
bodies so that they became mere objects or commodities.12 
In the early days of purity campaigns that attempted to challenge the double standard, the 
efforts of female moral reformers were countered by male opinions of prostitution. Male 
reformers often claimed that men were not the problem. Rather, a prostitute’s sufferings were 
self-inflicted and the result of voluntary vice. Inverting the arguments of female moral reformers, 
Reverend Ralph Wardlaw asked in his Lectures on Magdalenism: “How many of our young 
men, the inexperienced and the thoughtless, the light hearted and gay, are…haplessly led astray 
by immoral women?”13 In the defense of patriarchal values, these men argued, “Loose women 
infest[ed] the streets of the city,” and were so unashamed that they were “beyond the possibility 
                                                
12 Barbara J. Berg, The Remembered Gate: Origins of American Feminism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), 176-197. 
13 Rev. Ralph Wardlaw, Lectures on Magdalenism (New York: J.S. Redfield Clinton Hall, 1843), 46. 
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of reform.”14 Yet regardless of what their male counterparts said, female moral reformers fought 
for the moral and social redemption of their unfortunate sisters. As Nancy Cott has argued, 
upward mobility was indeed possible for lower-class women. Fallen women could be seen as 
capable and worthy of redemption because the cultural hegemony of the upper class suggested 
that social constraints existed for all women, regardless of class. The possibility of reformation 
became a predominant theme in the public conversation around Theresa Sturla before, during, 
and after her trial. On the eve of the Progressive Era, Chicagoans were willing to give Sturla a 
chance at redemption, albeit under a watchful eye.15 However, a chance at redemption was not 
simply a moral issue, but was also intertwined with contemporary understandings of women’s 
biology. 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, men of science generally believed that 
women’s nature, like men’s, was rooted in their biology. Historian Cynthia Eagle Russett points 
out that the debate over nature versus nurture represents a historical moment “in which social 
and scientific developments converged to create the possibility and urgency of a science of male 
and female nature and of the differences between them.”16 Victorian physicians and scientists 
drew from developments in life sciences as well as on new social sciences such as anthropology, 
psychology, and sociology, and the new sexual science attempted to be more precise and 
empirical than in the past. But the practice of medicine itself became more than a scientific 
discipline; it was a social institution that reinforced other social institutions that, according to 
                                                
14 Charles Christian, A Brief Treatise on the Police of the City of New York (New York: Southwick and 
Pelsue, 1812), 16. 
15 Berg, Remembered Gate; Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: “Woman’s Sphere” in New 
England, 1780-1835 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
16 Cynthia Eagle Russett, Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 2. 
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Russett, “spoke with the imperious tone of a discipline newly claiming, and in large measure 
being granted, decisive authority in matters social as well as strictly scientific.”17  
The notion of a scientific connection between female sex organs and the well being of a 
woman’s mind was well established by the medical community by 1882. By this time, midwifery 
had declined as male physicians developed the new medical field of gynecology. It became the 
norm that women would address their health concerns with men, creating a community of 
physicians with the power to make sweeping claims about the correlation between a woman’s 
sexuality and her mental health. Unlike their female predecessors, Victorian obstetricians did not 
represent women furthering the interest of women but served the interest of the male-dominated 
status quo. Medical texts and ideals were not developed to provide woman-centered answers to 
questions of meaning. Rather, in the words of historian Louise Lander, medical authorities “used 
the medical mystique to buttress the ability of the status quo to keep women in their place.”18 
More than any other hegemonic group, nineteenth century male physicians ultimately defined the 
place of woman in society. Medical authorities regarded man as the norm and woman as the 
defective “other.” Woman was so defective that she required the creation of an entire medical 
specialty devoted to caring for her unique disorders.19 
Interactions between male physicians and female patients led medical professionals in the 
burgeoning field of psychiatry to make assertions about the supposed control that women’s 
reproductive organs held over their bodies, of which there was no parallel in the male. It was 
believed that a man’s sexual impulses were subject to his will and could at various times be 
                                                
17 Russett, Sexual Science, 4; Louise Lander, Images of Bleeding: Menstruation as Ideology (New York: 
Orlando Press, 1988). 
18 Lander, Images of Bleeding, 4. 
19 Barker-Benfield, Horrors; Halttunen, Murder Most Foul; Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, “Puberty to 
Menopause: The Cycle of Femininity in Nineteenth-Century America” in Disorderly Conduct: Visions of 
Gender in Victorian America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 182-196; Lander, Images of Bleeding, 
7. 
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indulged or repressed. By contrast, women’s sexual organs were hidden within her body, 
“subject not to her will but to a biological clock of which women were only dimly aware and 
which they were clearly unable to control,” according to Carroll Smith-Rosenberg.20 Medical 
specialists declared that the female reproductive system was the fundamental determinant of 
woman’s nature, thereby asserting their own dominance over their female patients. According to 
Dr. John Wiltbank in 1854, “Women’s reproductive organs are preeminent.” It was “as if the 
Almighty, in creating the female sex, had taken the uterus and built up a woman around it.” Not 
only woman’s biology, but her “intellectual and moral perceptivity and forces…are feminine as 
her organs are.”21 Physicians in a range of disciplines offered scientific explanations for the 
fundamental differences between men and women in order to justify the obverse social roles that 
deemed women unfit for public life. While popular theories about puberty and menstruation 
naturally conceded the existence of sexuality and expressive emotion as normal aspects of 
development, they also served as a warning to women that they must regulate their emotions and 
confine themselves to the home, otherwise, as Smith-Rosenberg writes, “disease, insanity, and 
even death would surely follow.”22 The Victorian medical establishment frequently stressed that 
deviance and derangement was likely to follow the loss of virtue, illustrating the assumption that 
a woman’s intellect was dictated by her uterus, not her brain.23  
As historian Karen Halttunen asserts, nineteenth century medicine not only sexualized 
women’s nature, it transformed normal biological function into a pathological condition that 
demanded routine medical intervention. Woman’s reproductive process had such a “controlling 
influence” on her that it extended to her mental state. Hysteria, a “morbid state” in the male, was 
                                                
20 Smith-Rosenberg, “Puberty to Menopause,” 183. 
21 As quoted in Smith-Rosenberg, “Puberty to Menopause,” 184. 
22 Smith-Rosenberg, “Puberty to Menopause,” 188. 
23 Welter, Dimity Convictions, 21-41; Halttunen, Murder Most Foul, 172-207. 
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considered “the natural state” in the female. Pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, and menstruation 
were conditions that predisposed all women to the dangerous state of “temporary insanity” in 
which they were more prone than men to act abnormally. In these cases, “strange thoughts, 
extraordinary feelings, unseasonable appetites, criminal impulses, may haunt a mind at other 
times innocent and pure.”24 
Doctors such as Augustus Kinsley Gardner, who jointly specialized in obstetrics and 
insanity, argued for the intrinsic connections between female sexuality and insanity, making 
womanhood itself a form of deviance. One explanation for the takeover of female sexuality lies 
in the fact that male practitioners believed that women were simply too dangerous to be left in 
the incompetent hands of their own sex. At the same time, however, male physicians often 
expressed a pronounced repugnance against their own work. This phenomenon was the result of 
a complex of male attitudes toward female sexuality that mingled fear with hatred and disgust, 
shaped by the belief that masculine identity was dictated by rigorous self-control. The ideals that 
constituted middle-class manhood created “autophobic” male sexuality, “such that erotic arousal 
was chronically attended by dread and was experienced as disgust and guilt when it was felt to 
stray beyond the boundaries of self-control,” according to T. Walter Herbert.25 In turn, men 
projected that dread and disgust onto women, the source of their sexual arousal. Implicit in the 
ideal of female passionlessness was an underlying fear that at any moment a woman would 
undermine male self-command by succumbing to sexual appetite. According to Halttunen, “men 
                                                
24 Halttunen, Murder Most Foul, 188-189; Smith-Rosenberg, “The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and 
Role Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America,” in Disorderly Conduct, 197. 
25 T. Walter Herbert, Dearest Beloved: The Hawthornes and the Making of the Middle-Class Family, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 143. 
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insisted on women’s innate purity in an effort to overcome their dread of female sexual 
pollution.”26 Those feelings of dread largely emanated from the very existence of menstruation. 
During her trial, Sturla’s menstruation became a central issue and major subject of debate 
between the prosecution and defense. However, the defense of insanity induced by dysmenorrhea 
was not simply a medical matter, as it was believed at the time that biology equated to destiny. 
Victorian physicians often linked promiscuity and social class, characterizing lower-class women 
as overtly sexual beings who did not feel the necessity of self-control. Additionally, it was 
commonly believed that menstruating women were prone to temporary insanity and fits of 
aggression or violence. Women under excessive menstrual influence, English physician Edward 
Tilt wrote, “should be incarcerated for the length of their menstruating years” for their own good 
and that of society.27 For these reasons, Feminist scholar Louise Lander contends that the 
function of menstruation itself should be looked at as more than a biological phenomenon, but 
rather a “cultural event intimately bound up with larger questions of the place of women in 
society.”28 During Sturla’s trial, her attorney linked his client’s class, sexuality, and criminality, 
together shifting her menstruation from the realm of biology to that of culture.29 
For both women and physicians of the Victorian era, menstruation was surrounded by 
ambivalence. Historically speaking, menstruation was marked as a period of danger and shame 
that came to exist as a punishment for Eve’s transgressions. By the nineteenth century, many 
women viewed their own menstrual blood as peculiarly contaminated and menstruation itself as 
a mark of their inferiority to men. Perpetuating these notions, physicians argued that women 
                                                
26 Halttunen, Murder Most Foul, 189-191; Barker-Benfield, Horrors of the Half-Known Life.  
27 Edward Tilt, The Change of Life in Health and Disease, 4th ed. (New York: Bermingham & Co., 1882), 
13. 
28 Louise Lander, Images of Bleeding: Menstruation as Ideology (New York: Orlando Press, 1988), 2. 
29 Smith-Rosenberg, “Puberty to Menopause,” 182-196; Smith-Rosenberg, “The Hysterical Woman,” 
197-216. 
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were weak, diseased, and dependent due to their menstruation. Physicians also conflated 
menstruation and sexuality, seeing menstruation as either a monthly peak of women’s sexual 
desire or as a biological method of helping women to control their sexual impulses. Writing in 
1844, British surgeon and physician George Rowe suggested, “Might not this monthly discharge 
be ordained for the purpose of controlling woman’s violent sexual passions…by unloading the 
uterine vessels…so as to prevent the promiscuous intercourse which would prove destructive to 
the purest interests in civil life…”30 Victorian medical doctrine declared menstrual pain and 
cramps to be psychosomatic, and this social ideology of women’s inferiority bred insecurities 
and, in Lander’s words, gave “medical ideology enormous power over [women’s] sense of self 
and their sense of reality.” Menstruation represented freedom from otherwise being kept busy by 
the burdens of pregnancy and nursing, thus posing a potential threat to the world of men. The 
medical community used the menstrual cycle as a vehicle for keeping women in their place, 
especially when they acted in a way that threatened the existing social order.31 
Another vehicle for keeping women in their place was domestic abuse, which has been an 
epidemic for most of American history. In the colonial period, American law did little to protect 
battered wives, and in the few cases in which a man was prosecuted and convicted, they usually 
only had to pay a small fine or simply vow to reform. Public opinion in the nineteenth century 
condemned the act of corporal punishment against women under the belief that their inherent 
gentleness and docility should exonerate them from such violence. However, this sentiment did 
not necessarily translate to the protection of wives against their abusive husbands, which 
received little public attention for most of the century. This phenomenon can be partially 
                                                
30 George Robert Rowe, On Some of the Most Important Disorders of Women (London: John Churchill, 
1844), 27-28; Smith-Rosenberg, “Puberty to Menopause,” 182-196. 
31 Lander, Images of Bleeding, 3-10. 
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attributed to the fact that Anglo-American customs, laws, and religion have historically promoted 
a wife’s subordination to her husband.32  
Feminists and reformers of the antebellum era, who spoke out against the canon of 
domesticity that they argued oppressed women, ironically used the idealized views of family and 
marriage to argue for the improvement wives’ status and treatment within the home. The canon 
of domesticity was fundamentally constrictive, however, and essentially forced women to model 
their behavior after an extremely narrow view of femininity in order to gain any public sympathy 
or legal help. In Sturla’s case, then, it was absolutely critical that the murderess be established as 
a woman who fit the mold of proper femininity and domesticity. And the only reason she was in 
her position as a fallen woman was because of the man who forced her to stay there. 
One of the areas of the historiography that the Sturla trial most illuminates is that of late 
nineteenth century crime and criminology, a subject on which there has been surprisingly little 
written. The most in-depth study of Victorian America’s captivation with violent crime and 
Gothic horror is Karen Halttunen’s 1998 monograph, Murder Most Foul. Halttunen’s seminal 
work illustrates that a fascination with murder and the killer him- or herself is a product of post-
colonial American Gothic culture. Acts of murder throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century “pose[d] troubling questions about the moral nature of humankind. Murder thus demands 
that a community come to terms with the crime—confront what has happened and endeavor to 
explain it, in an effort to restore order to the world.” In literate societies, written narratives of 
murder attempted to make sense of meaningless violent incidents.33  
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According to Halttunen, the Victorian construction of the murderer as a madman or –
woman “was the purest cultural expression of the murderer as Gothic monster.” These killers 
were considered deformed in mind, morality, and physiology. They committed the most violent 
and pointless murders with the least remorse or regret, violating the enlightened understanding of 
human nature, in which reason and logic prevailed. Thus, the development of the insanity 
defense signified an effort to scientifically formalize what was incomprehensible to the liberal 
imagination; “‘insanity’ was proffered as the catch-all explanation for the homicide that was 
motiveless, shockingly unanticipated, heinous.” The madman “was the extreme expression of the 
criminal alien.”34  
Sturla’s case, however, shows that the opposite could also be true. Although she had 
committed a shocking and violent murder, the crime was not necessarily considered 
incomprehensible given Stiles’ mistreatment of his paramour. In addition to the claim of self-
defense, Sturla’s alleged insanity was used by the defense not to prescribe meaning to the crime 
itself, but to frame the defendant as the victim of innate Italian “passions” and her own diseased 
womanhood, ultimately establishing her as a figure of sympathy in a male-dominated courtroom.  
Halttunen’s study is also useful as an overview of what nineteenth century alienists 
believed were the root causes of insanity and homicidal mania. In some cases childhood disease 
or heredity was cited as a cause, while other doctors invoked phrenology as a scientific method 
for reading the signs of disease in the defendant’s physical appearance. It is worth noting that of 
the many cases of homicidal insanity addressed by Halttunen, only one of those defendants was a 
woman: Margaret Howard, who murdered her husband’s lover in Cincinnati in 1849. While the 
particulars of the crime differ, Howard’s treatment in court foreshadowed that of Theresa Sturla. 
Like Sturla, Howard’s physiological femaleness was recognized as the primary source of 
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insanity. As Howard’s own attorney claimed during her trial, “women are subject to state of 
constitution intimately connected with excitement of mind, rendering them at times peculiarly 
subject to perversion of intellect, but most commonly irritable temper.”35 
Halttunen’s study of criminal insanity in nineteenth century America is certainly expansive, but 
it is by no means exhaustive. In some ways, her overview of Victorian criminal insanity cases 
provokes more questions than it does provide answers. It is apparent that nineteenth century 
alienists had a great many theories about what could cause insanity or homicidal mania, but such 
cases varied so greatly in their particulars that only individual case studies truly help us 
understand what they mean in an historical context. One of the only comprehensive case studies 
of a criminal insanity case is Charles E. Rosenberg’s The Trial of the Assassin Guiteau (1968), 
which details the story of President Garfield’s killer. Rosenberg offers a close analysis of the trial 
and the circumstances that led up to it, and examines the ways in which politics, morality, law, 
medicine and psychiatry converged in the early 1880s. While there are some key differences 
between the Guiteau and Sturla cases, Rosenberg’s work is valuable as a model for this study for 
a number of reasons. The two cases are similar in that the biographies of Guiteau and Sturla 
functioned as mirrors of American social values. In both cases, the actual facts of the defendant’s 
lives were overshadowed by the need of others to use them as a warning and educational tool.36 
The cases are also comparable in the fact that they both dealt with the concept of “moral 
insanity,” which itself was a point of contention among both physicians and legal professionals. 
British physician and ethnologist James Cowles Prichard first defined moral insanity in 1835 as 
“madness consisting in a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, 
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temper, habits, moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or 
defect of the interest or knowing and reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane 
illusion or hallucinations.”37 One important difference between these cases is the fact that, as 
Rosenberg points out, it is “unquestionable” that Guiteau legitimately suffered from mental 
illness. Rosenberg does not attempt to diagnose the assassin, but notes that twentieth century 
clinicians who have studied the case tend to agree in their evaluation that he exhibited 
characteristics of paranoid schizophrenia. This assessment is key, as it highlights the fact that 
Sturla did not exhibit clear signs of mental illness. It is apparent to the twenty-first century 
observer, however, that she did suffer extensive trauma at the hands of her abuser, signs of which 
were brushed off both in the press and by doctors in the courtroom as obvious indicators of her 
insanity. 
While historians have paid attention to Victorian constructions of womanhood and 
medical norms as they pertain to women for many years, only fairly recently have there been 
studies focused on women defendants in capital murder cases. Like Sturla, virtually all these 
cases defined the defendant’s reproductive system as an inextricable link to their misbehavior. 
Many nineteenth century lawyers constructed narratives that played into preconceptions about 
the defendant and victim. A. Cherree Carlson’s The Crimes of Womanhood examines the 
narratives constructed during the trials of seven women in this time period, including some well-
known cases such as Madame Restelle, Lizzie Borden, and Mary Todd Lincoln. In the nineteenth 
century, the law was white, male, and middle class. Although this fact changed slowly after the 
Civil War, women of all classes were regularly excluded from the legal arena. As Carlson points 
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out, “the possession of a female body dispossessed one of the right to participate in the crafting 
of laws controlling that body,” and any privilege or preference “came as a gift from men, in the 
form they decided upon.”38  
In the late 1980s-early 1990s, historian Robert Ireland wrote several pioneering articles 
about the “unwritten law” as it applied to women in the nineteenth century. Under the auspices 
of the unwritten law, juries generally dismissed cases in which an outraged male could justifiably 
kill the libertine or seducer of a woman in his life, be it a wife, sister, or daughter. Women, 
however, were often not afforded the same opportunity for justice. Ireland’s 1992 article, 
“Frenzied and Fallen Females,” published in the Journal of Women’s History, highlights women 
defendants and examined the relationships between sexual dishonor and violence, femininity and 
insanity, and rage and law.39 In a study of cases in 1843-96, Ireland has found the invention of an 
unwritten law that frequently excused killers who avenged sexual dishonor. According to 
Ireland, men had a duty to protect women from “slimy, snake-like libertines” and to punish 
“Eve-like women who too readily embraced those libertines.”40 Male murderers were often 
portrayed as protectors of women’s virtue. Woman defendants, on the other hand, were generally 
represented as biologically weak, suffering from hysteria that rendered them legally insane and 
thus innocent of criminal liability. Conversely, prosecutors characterized these women as 
inherently licentious and responsible for the evils of society. These competing characterizations 
were precisely what occurred during Sturla’s trial.41 Most defendants—both men and women—
in unwritten law cases pleaded insanity, but the conceptual foundation for this defense was 
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bound strictly by social constructs of sexuality. Men would claim that their insanity resulted 
from a temporary rage over manly dishonor, while female insanity was derivative of an inherent 
condition of emotional instability emanating from their reproductive system.42  
What is lacking in the existing literature is a synthesis of the historical elements of 
nineteenth century womanly ideals, women’s health, and femininity as they played out in a court 
of law. In the proper light, the trial of Theresa Sturla represents the fusion of these components. 
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, as Sturla’s case demonstrates, a fallen woman could 
realistically use the unwritten law to her advantage, opening an avenue toward moral and social 
redemption. Her trial deserves a feminist treatment that serves to emphasize the male-dominated 
court’s seizure of Sturla’s sense of self and of her own reality by portraying her as a victim at the 
mercy of her own menstruation. At the same time, Sturla’s murder of her abusive seducer 
garnered the sympathy of women from both the underclass and respectable society, revealing a 
cross-class sisterhood that existed in Chicago near the turn of the century. 
The murder occurred at a significant moment in Chicago’s history. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, the city was internationally renowned for its abundance of vice and 
violence. Chicagoans struggled with the pervasiveness of vice, especially prostitution, in their 
city. Vice was relatively contained in the red-light districts on the south side of the city, but the 
municipal government made little minimal efforts to expunge prostitution. This, combined with 
the massive numbers of young, single men arriving in the city at the time allowed the sex trade to 
thrive well into the twentieth century.  In his extensive study of homicide in Chicago, Jeffrey 
Adler found that at the turn of the twentieth century, the city experienced more homicides than 
any other urban center in the United States. Chicago murderers, Theresa Sturla included, 
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“insisted that violence was a logical response to the pressures and tensions they encountered.”43 
In the midst of all this violence, many Chicagoans and visitors to the city expressed the necessity 
for dramatic social change. In the summer of 1876, evangelist Dwight L. Moody selected 
Chicago as the fourth of five major cities from which to launch a massive and ambitious program 
to revive and evangelize America. The three-month revival campaign was considered a 
spectacular success among many contemporary observers. This included one of the Chicago’s 
most elite citizens, Marshall Field, who arranged a special service for his employees presided 
over by Moody and his associate, Ira D. Sankey.44 
The 1870s and 1880s saw a remarkable wave of local women-led reform efforts to 
improve Chicago society. In 1874 Frances Willard, former Dean of the Woman’s College at 
Northwestern University, took over the leadership of the local Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union, directly leading to the formation of abstention societies such as the Temperance Reform 
Club and the establishment of the Woman’s Temperance Publishing Association in 1880. 
Paralleling the efforts of the temperance movement, groups such as the House of the Good 
Shepherd and the Chicago Erring Woman’s Refuge for Reform were formed to focus on the 
problems of vice, prostitution, and the reformation of fallen women. The Moral Educational 
Society, formed in 1882, attempted to disseminate information on marriage and parenthood, the 
abolition of vice, and the moral training of youth. In 1886, the Florence Crittenton Anchorage of 
the W.C.T.U. was founded “to care for unfortunate girls who have been led astray and to protect 
the innocent and friendless from being led into the haunts of sin of a great city.”45 The same year 
saw the organization of the Protective Agency for Women and Children, which, according to 
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reform publication The Christian Union, endeavored to afford “protection from all offences and 
crimes against the purity and virtue of women and children.”46  
The Sturla trial occurred just as these groups and others were initially organizing and 
provided early Progressive Era reformers a heartbreaking model of exactly what could go wrong 
if men and women did not refrain from vice and licentiousness. Within the Chicago reform 
movement, the direct result of Sturla’s trial was the work of O.E. Turner. Using trial transcripts, 
newspaper reports, and his own recollections of the trial, Turner wrote and published the Sturla-
Stiles Tragedy in 1883, less than a year after the end of the trial while Sturla was still in prison. 
Unfortunately, the official trial transcripts have been lost to history, making Turner’s words our 
only direct access to the Sturla trial. However, Turner does provide lengthy verbatim accounts of 
what was occurred in court, verifiable by newspaper reports that printed the transcripts following 
each day of the trial. I have used Turner’s book extensively for this study, and have made note of 
instances in which I quote the author’s words directly versus his use of contemporary printed 
materials. 
In addition to providing a detailed account of the trial itself, Turner framed the lives and 
relationship of Theresa Sturla and Charles Stiles as a morality tale that might educate the citizens 
of Chicago. Through the first half of the nineteenth century, murder narratives shifted from the 
didactic execution sermons that had the role of addressing transcendent matters of salvation to 
the “worldly particulars” of the criminal, i.e., biographical background, social context of the 
crime, the sequence of events culminating in murder, and specific details of time and place.47 
Around the middle of the century, popular literature began to reconstruct the murderer from 
common sinner to “moral alien,” a response to new understandings of human nature prompted by 
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the Enlightenment.48 Karen Halttunen has examined a historiographical debate regarding the use 
of sensationalism in the nineteenth century. While some previous scholars have regarded 
criminal narratives as sensationalism “for its own sake,” she argues instead that it was a didactic 
tool.49 Turner’s book exemplifies this shift, not acting as a sensationalistic attempt to capitalize 
on popular interest in the crime, but serving the cultural purpose of assigning meaning to the 
violent event. Sturla-Stiles Tragedy is the main primary source document used for this study, but 
I have also drawn from a great number of local and national newspaper reports, medical 
documents, and periodicals published by those active in the reform movement. 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter one covers the four months between 
Sturla’s arrest just after the murder and the beginning of the trial, explaining the fact that the 
press illustrated ambivalence among Chicagoans who sympathized with a fallen woman after the 
death of a prominent and well-known member of society. I argue here that Sturla’s case shows 
the relative plasticity of Victorian views of social class, which were based on gendered notions 
of morality. Chicagoans learned early on that Stiles had betrayed the ideals of middle-class 
masculine respectability, allowing for the prostitute who killed him to become an object of 
sympathy in the eyes of the public. 
Chapter two covers the trial itself, providing an analysis of the witnesses, testimonies, 
and evidence. The main argument of this chapter centers on the idea that notions about 
criminality and insanity were culturally defined. As they appeared as expert witnesses, medical 
professionals established a biological understanding of insanity, which was then mirrored by lay 
witness testimonies. These medical concepts clashed with nineteenth century legal 
understandings of moral culpability, which were based in Enlightenment notions of free will. 
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This conflict became even more pronounced in cases such as Sturla’s, in which murderesses 
claimed self-defense and insanity. Sturla became a sympathetic figure in court as she stood at the 
intersection of competing discourses about crime and insanity. 
The third and final chapter explains that self-defense and insanity became secondary 
issues behind Victorian ideals of morality, and I argue that the trial came to represent a crisis of 
class and morals that was brewing at the dawn of the Progressive Era in Chicago. Throughout the 
trial, Sturla received public support from two well-known women in the community: Madame 
Carrie Watson, who represented vice; and Mrs. Hortensia Black, an important member of 
evangelical reform movements in the city. These two women came to embody the public debate 
over whether or not Sturla was capable of redemption. 
In terms of the law and the nature of society at the time, it is somewhat surprising that an 
incontrovertibly fallen woman was able to avoid capital punishment after murdering a man of a 
higher class than her own. This paper will show that Sturla was shaped into a sympathetic figure 
by the press and by her attorney, leading to her exoneration and an opportunity to enter 
respectable society after her prison sentence. Sturla’s trial illustrates the connections between 
female sexuality, crime, violence, and perceptions of insanity in the nineteenth century, 
providing unique insight into unanticipated compassion from Chicago society. This case is also 
historically important as a mirror of American social values, reflecting the fluidity of class 
mobility for fallen women. There has been very little written on nineteenth century women 
defendants, but scholarship would benefit from giving these women the attention they deserve. 
Dysmenorrhea-induced insanity cases like Sturla’s indicate that a “fallen angel” might well rise 
again and become a true woman with a single pull of the trigger. 
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CHAPTER I: “A WANTON’S REVENGE” 
The road to Theresa Sturla’s moral vindication ended with the jury’s verdict on the 
twentieth day of her trial, but it began well before the proceedings—in the days immediately 
following her arrest. Stiles’ death and the subsequent trial were highly sensationalized by local 
and national newspapers. In the earliest reports of the murder, the media painted Stiles as a 
bright, generous, well educated, and naturally talented “man of the world.” Despite the fact that 
his intimates recognized him as “morally shaky,” Stiles remained a respected man in the world of 
Chicago commerce who moved through society “by virtue of his birth, natural ability, which 
gave him position, and of his peculiar social qualities.” Sturla, on the other hand, was portrayed 
as a “vindictive and continually threatening” young woman of “doubtful repute.” 50 The 
murderess initially billed as “the green-eyed monster” and portrayed as a typical “ruined” 
woman whose propensity for crime was predictable, however, quickly became the protagonist of 
the story when the media began sharing the details of the couple’s relationship. News reports 
revealed that Stiles had lured his paramour to Chicago under the promise of marriage, but had 
never followed through in the five years since. He also forced her to continue working as a 
prostitute in order to fund his gambling habit after having promised in vain to help her become a 
respectable woman.51 It was true that Sturla had led a life of vice since she was a teenager, but to 
a readership interpreting these events through Victorian understandings of gender, sex, and 
violence, Stiles’ behavior and mistreatment of Sturla outweighed his superior social status. 
Stiles’ betrayal of Victorian ideals for a man ultimately led to the media largely depicting him 
not as an unfortunate man slain by his lover, but a sly libertine who likely deserved what he got. 
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Typically, in sensationalized cases of violent crime involving a prostitute, the woman was 
the victim and the man who had committed the act was often not held legally responsible. 
Exemplifying this was one of the most infamous cases of the century: the 1836 murder of a 
young prostitute named Helen Jewett. Following the discovery of Jewett’s burned and mutilated 
corpse, a nineteen-year-old clerk named Richard Robinson was tried for the murder. When 
Jewett’s madam and other prostitutes testified against Robinson, the trial shifted focus from the 
defendant to a judgment of the witnesses’ integrity and moral character. Robinson was ultimately 
acquitted despite a public belief that the weight of evidence was against him. The Jewett murder 
illustrates that the life of a prostitute was valueless, yet that of a man who engaged in activities of 
equal licentiousness would be preserved, even at the expense of justice.52 
Through the Sturla case, Chicagoans clarified a social order in which class and gender 
were intricately entwined with moral expectations, applying gendered notions of morality to both 
parties. The public expressed great contempt for Stiles’ behavior, allowing Sturla to become a 
figure of sympathy. One aspect of the case that makes it particularly significant is that it 
represents a moment in which the public held a prostitute—and a murderer, no less—in higher 
regard than the man whose blood she spilled. Public opinion was likely dictated by two things. 
The first was the many first-hand accounts of Stiles’ aggressive behavior, confirmed by Stiles 
himself in the form of letters addressed to Sturla, which were printed in the press within weeks of 
the murder. Second, Sturla granted nearly endless interviews to reporters between July and 
November while she awaited her trial, giving her the opportunity to address a city full of curious 
spectators and justify her actions before the trial began. Thanks to the attention from the press, 
the public learned early on that Stiles had betrayed the ideals of middle-class masculine 
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respectability by constantly gambling away all of his money, abusing his lover, and forcing her 
to work in a brothel to fund his habit. 
From the very first reports of Stiles’ murder, the press illustrated Chicago’s fascination 
with such a sensational crime and its simultaneous ambivalence surrounding the circumstances 
of the case. The treatment of the couple in the media is reflected in O.E. Turner’s Sturla-Stiles 
Tragedy. Aside from acting as a chronicler of the trial in question, Turner wrote the Sturla-Stiles 
Tragedy as a cautionary tale. His intention with the book was not to appeal “to the grosser 
instincts of an idle and perverted curiosity which fattens upon sensational tales of tragedy and 
over-drawn fiction.” Instead, he aimed to “probe to the bottom of the mass of corruption which 
like a festering sore is eating to the very hearts-core of society.” According to Turner, the lives of 
both Sturla and Stiles “were under a perpetual contamination of body and mind,” embodying the 
corrupt and perverted social relations that were the root cause of the evil in Chicago and 
American society at large. 53 There are no records that clearly indicate exactly who O.E. Turner 
was, but the final chapter of Sturla-Stiles Tragedy indicates that he was a moral reformer who 
regarded the entire saga as a morality tale from which Chicagoans must learn the repercussions 
of living lives of vice and corruption.54 
 Turner gives biographical accounts of Theresa Sturla and Charles Stiles, the facts of 
which he hopes “may incite thought and subserve a moral purpose,” beginning with establishing 
Theresa as a victim of circumstance.55 Reflecting common nineteenth century essentialist ideas 
about race, Turner remarks that in Italy, the social standard is such that women are the inferior 
and slave of man. For Italian women, “virtue and purity [have] no foundation in principle, being 
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only a condition which the superior power of man enforces upon woman that he may better 
gratify his own selfish and lustful passions.”56 Having hailed from the country that gave birth to 
some of the greatest philosophers, the greatest libertines, and the greatest tyrants the world has 
ever known, Italian “religious and social ideas and customs were interwoven with the entire 
fabric” of Theresa’s life.57 The impressionable young Italian began down her wayward path 
when she became romantically involved with another Italian immigrant named Gregaio 
Galvenio.58 
Sturla and Galvenio had known each other since they were small children and as they got 
older their attachment developed into what Turner called a “fervent passion.” Galvenio had led 
Theresa’s parents to believe that he would marry their daughter. Theresa, however, was oblivious 
to the “knowledge of her own nature and the insidious leadings of passion,” and was subjected to 
Galvenio’s “will and caprices.” When Theresa was fourteen years old, Galvenio “accomplished 
her ruin” following a night of “Bacchanalian revelries.”59 Galvenio persuaded Sturla to take 
apartments at the bagnio of Madame Fay, ostensibly for the purpose of having instructions in 
music. Sturla’s parents eventually learned of their daughter’s relations with Galvenio and 
disowned her, leaving her to fend for herself at the age of fifteen. Turner concludes Sturla’s 
biography with a show of pity: 
Let her sin be what it would, in consideration of the tenderness and inexperience 
of her years, the indiscretion and final cruelty of her parents, can there be a 
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mother in all the land whose heart would not reach out toward her in 
commiseration and a desire to rescue rather than condemn her?60 
Turner’s reflections on the life of Theresa Sturla mirror much of the rhetoric found in 
newspaper reports and the trial itself. The young Italian had lacked the virtue and purity expected 
of women by American society and was inherently influenced by impulsivity and passion. She 
had indeed led a life of sin, but she was ultimately a victim of her own cultural background, the 
evils of her urban environment, and most importantly, the libertine that had seduced her.61 This 
version of the murderess would have been familiar to a literate, late-nineteenth century audience. 
Imagery of the fallen woman as a guiltless victim preyed upon by evil forces had been a fixture 
of popular literature for fifty years by the time of the trial. Since the introduction of the penny 
press in the 1830s and 1840s, American readers were inundated with varying tales of betrayed 
virtue that portrayed women as innocent lambs being devoured by sly wolves. The outcast 
woman portrayed in literature allowed for titillation of Victorian audiences by providing a look 
inside the repressed secret lives of men and women. In order to generate sympathy for a 
character, authors writing about the life of a fallen woman had to depict her as an exploited 
victim. The implication of this fictional formula enforced expectations about women’s sexual 
passivity and submission to male authority. Because she had neither chosen her fate nor 
expressed any sexual motivation for her actions, the fallen woman did not undermine woman’s 
innate purity and passionlessness, allowing for sympathy from society.62 This characterization of 
fallen women allowed Sturla a degree of class mobility and sympathy—even as a murderess. 
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 From his birth in 1850 until his death at Theresa’s hand, Charles Stiles had led a 
privileged life. He was born in Dixon, Illinois to Sybil Catherine Stiles and General E.B. Stiles, a 
prominent local politician and businessman. As a young man he spent several years touring 
Europe and receiving education at universities in Dresden and Heidelberg, eventually gaining 
fluency in German, French, and Italian. When he returned to Chicago he began his professional 
career as a caller with the Grain, Provision, and Stock Board. According to the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, Stiles quickly became known as “the lightning caller” and was “without doubt one of 
the best callers in the United States.”63 His “ready tongue” and “bright intellect” made him 
popular “among men of his kind, and no party was complete without him,” noted another news 
report.64 Despite his professional and social prowess, even the earliest newspaper reports 
recognized that Stiles had chosen “a fast life, like hundreds of others in [the] city, living only in 
the present.”65 Stiles’ hallmark was his “perfect mania for gambling in every conceivable form.” 
He did not distinguish a “moral difference” between betting $10,000 on the turn of the stock 
market and $100 on cards, or $1,000 on the result of a horse race. To him, “one way of risking 
money was as legitimate as another.”66  
Stiles’ propensity for gambling and his association with other fast young men perfectly 
place him in the realm of what had become known as sporting culture, which had originated in 
1830s New York City. Male sporting culture developed in nineteenth century urban 
environments that had drawn young men away from their families and into living and working 
situations that emphasized homosocial relationships. These young men, who often lived in 
boardinghouses and had their own money to spend, could find enjoyment in any number of the 
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city’s offerings of cockfighting and bare-knuckle prizefights, liquor, theatrical entertainment, and 
commercial sex.67 Young men migrating from rural environments were warned of the dangers 
that awaited them in the city and a culture that was at odds with middle-class respectability. 
Undoubtedly, some boys and men found these warnings appealing rather than threatening, as 
freedom from middle-class constraint was what they desired.68  
This alternative urban world celebrated an ideal of leisure devoted to the pursuit of 
pleasure. Like New York City, Chicago offered opportunities for a great variety of theatrical 
performances, gambling, intoxicating drinks, and blood sports. The sociable world of sporting 
allowed for the fraternity of men of all ages and socioeconomic backgrounds to unite in the 
pursuit of leisure, thrills, and pleasure. One defining element of sporting culture was the dream 
of unrestricted male heterosexuality. Women were nothing more than instruments of male 
pleasure to be used and discarded with impunity. For a sporting man like Stiles, a wife equated to 
the limitation of a man’s sexual and personal freedom, while the prostitute represented 
something of an abstract sexual object.69 
Labeled a “confirmed gamester and as fast a man as there was in town,” by the Chicago 
Times, Stiles had seduced Sturla. The charismatic and smooth-talking libertine met the woman 
who would ultimately end his life in 1877 on a trip to Baltimore when she was just sixteen years 
old. At that time, Sturla was working as an “inmate” at the apartments of Madame Fay under the 
name “Italian Effie.” 70 She was well known at the brothel due to her skillful piano playing and 
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operatic singing voice and she gained something of a following, as many men admired her for 
her beauty and character. O.E. Turner gave this description of Theresa: 
Her voice, whose richness and capacity was beyond that of the canary bird 
or nightingale; her large, dark eyes flashing beneath the dark silken lashes 
and heavy arching brows; her abundant waiving hair, whose gloss and 
beauty outrivaled that of the oft-quoted raven’s wing; her lithe and 
graceful form, and ardent, impulsive ways were her attractions.71 
Enamored with Sturla, Stiles spent nearly every day of his trip in her company. Before 
leaving Baltimore, Stiles gave Sturla a glowing account of his hometown of Chicago, 
representing himself as one of the city’s most prominent men. He told her he had great influence 
with the dramatic press “and that he could by the wave of the hand raise her to great prominence 
on the stage, and as a shining star in the high circles in which he was a distinguished character.” 
For several weeks after leaving town, he regularly wrote her letters full of fervent expressions of 
love that were frequently accompanied with solicitations for money to cover his debts. He 
continued to give her excited descriptions of the attractions of the city and, according to Turner, 
“enthused her brain with high expectations” of her potential for success as a performer. Sturla 
was finally convinced and travelled to Chicago to be with Stiles, only to spend the next five 
years enduring violent physical and emotional abuse and being forced to work at a brothel in 
order to bankroll her paramour’s gambling habit.72 
The Chicago public was introduced to the Stiles murder the day after it transpired when it 
was given great attention in all the city’s major papers, including the Chicago Daily Tribune, the 
Chicago Times, and the Daily Inter Ocean. Big-city newspapers such as these were themselves a 
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technological wonder, designed to entertain and attract everyone from the rich to illiterate poor. 
Journalists of the late nineteenth century specialized in crime stories, entertaining features, and 
stories of the downtrodden that served to entertain the masses and “rake the muck.”73 Prior to the 
nineteenth century stories of crimes were transmitted to the public largely in the form of the 
execution sermon. This sacred narrative focused on the spiritual condition of the criminal rather 
than the bloody actions and judicial process that led to their condemnation at the scaffold.74 By 
the time of Theresa’s trial, however, the sacred narrative had been replaced by secular accounts 
such as criminal biographies and printed transcripts of murder trials, turning the attention of the 
public to the crime itself and its unfolding in real time. As Karen Halttunen has observed, many 
scholars explained that the genre of the criminal narrative was an expression of sensationalism 
for its own sake. Instead, she argues that these sensationalistic accounts represented a new and 
different approach to making sense of violent crime.75 In large cities like Chicago, the 
sensational penny press accompanied the emergence of a mass readership that sought meaning in 
the face of violence and looked for a new way of facing the crime of murder.76 
As the crime occurred in the early hours of the morning, the Chicago papers initially 
picked up the story that very afternoon. The following day, on July 11, 1882, an in-depth article 
entitled “A Wanton’s Revenge” was published in the Chicago Daily Tribune, taking up a full 
page of the twelve-page issue and containing all the trappings of sensational journalism that 
often dominated the urban press of the time. The article detailed the particulars of the murder, 
gave biographies of both Sturla and Stiles, and included witness accounts from other Palmer 
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House boarders and interviews with a handful of people who could account for the dysfunction 
of the couple. Considering the length and detail of the article in the city’s most prominent 
newspaper, this piece would set the tone for how the public would regard the murderess and her 
victim months before her trial began. 
Beginning with the subheading “A Deliberate Murder,” the Tribune article was initially 
sympathetic to Stiles, “a young man known to tens of thousands in Chicago,” and painted Sturla 
as little more than a vengeful prostitute. As it was reported, the couple had been living together 
for five or six years, maintaining a relationship “not recognized by the law.” Stiles had allegedly 
grown tired of her, which lead Sturla to establish her own bagnio “on a South Side thoroughfare, 
where she offered opportunities to other women to become as bad as she was.” The couple 
repeatedly came together and parted during their years together, and Stiles made efforts to “quit 
himself of the complication but the woman had a great hold upon him.” Sturla repeatedly told 
reporters that throughout their relationship she had handed Stiles a “very large percentage of the 
wages of her sin.” It appears that at least some members press had a difficult time believing this, 
as one reporter proclaimed that there was “too much reason to believe…that he accepted for his 
own use the money which she earned” by working as a prostitute.77 
The article goes on to explain that although the couple never actually married they 
labeled themselves man and wife, Sturla having unofficially adopted the name “Madeleine 
Stiles.” Friends and acquaintances of Stiles were apparently aware of the way he treated his 
mistress, but largely dismissed his actions in favor of the great admiration they had for him and 
his business talents. As one of his coworkers said Stiles “was a genial, whole-souled fellow 
among the boys. He had two characters—like a good many other men. He had no moral 
principle, and treated that woman badly. There is no doubt that she had given him thousands of 
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dollars.” Another friend of Stiles discussed his opinion that “the Italian [was] a pretty good 
woman for one of her class,” and that she had been “badly abused.” Despite his esteem for Stiles, 
the friend admitted that he “was no good.” Not long before he was killed, Stiles told this friend, 
“I am going to live with Madeleine again. A fellow must live with somebody. I don’t want to get 
married, because I might get tired of a wife in a month.”78 
When Sturla’s trial began in November, the defense would argue (with support from 
expert witnesses) that the abuse she suffered at the hand of Stiles was one of the key factors 
leading to her insanity. The Tribune helped to establish the extent of Stiles’ abuse toward Sturla 
by including commentary from several people who were familiar with the couple and the way 
Stiles treated Sturla. One of these was William A. Pinkerton of the Pinkerton Detective Agency, 
who would take the witness stand during the trial several months later. Pinkerton told the 
Tribune that about three years prior to the murder, Stiles had called him, stating that he had 
“been insufferably annoyed by the woman.” Stiles claimed that Sturla had been extorting large 
sums of money from him, and had made him a laughing stock at the Board of Trade by sending 
him a bouquet of “carefully selected thistles and cabbage-leaves.” When Pinkerton went to 
Sturla’s home to confront her about the claims, he was surprised to learn that it was actually 
Stiles who owed her large sums of money and that she simply wanted to be left alone. After 
hearing about details of the abuse she had suffered, Pinkerton made an official report and gave it 
to Stiles with the order to keep away from her, reminding him that “she was an Italian and of a 
revengeful nature, and would certainly protect herself in case of an emergency.” A short time 
later, Stiles got “comfortably drunk” and broke the order he had been given by going to 
Theresa’s apartment. Pinkerton was called yet again, chastising Stiles for breaking his promise 
not to return. Stiles replied that by calling the Pinkertons in the first place, he “only wanted to 
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make a bluff against the woman.” The shrewd detective warned him that Theresa’s “impetuous 
nature would brook no more insults, and that unless he (Stiles) conducted himself better bodily 
harm would certainly happen to him at her hands.”79 
The most telling feature of the entire Tribune piece were the twenty-one letters published 
in the article. The letters were intended to “give the public a fair idea as to the exact relations 
between Stiles and his mistress,” and give the historian the only unfiltered record of their 
relationship. In cases of violence between lovers, it was not unusual for letters to appear in print 
or as evidence during a trial. For voyeuristic Victorian audiences, these private expressions of 
emotion were appealing because they were examples of genuine romantic prose and because 
many believed in the bare truthfulness of love letters.80 Except for one short note signed “Effie,” 
all of the printed letters were addressed to Sturla from Stiles. These give us great insight into the 
nature of their relationship, particularly his treatment toward her. Some of the notes mix words 
of affection with appeals for pity and money. Others express regret for past misconduct and 
request forgiveness.  
Several letters in particular stand out among the rest, as they contain manipulative 
instructions and warnings. With these letters, the public saw the intimate record of a supposed 
gentleman forfeiting his social standing by betraying the ideals of Victorian manliness. By all 
accounts, Theresa seldom drank alcohol, but Stiles seems to have repeatedly projected his own 
behavior onto her by forbidding her from drinking: “Be a good girl and don’t drink, whatever 
you do,” he writes in one letter. He ends another with, “I shall continue in every one of my letters 
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to warn you against drink. You know its subtle evil effects as well as any one.”81 Stiles attempted 
to mold Sturla into the proper ideal for a woman, but disregarded his own masculine 
responsibilities by not offering the gallant protection afforded to that role and instead threatened 
her with violence. The longest and most disturbing letter among those printed in the paper 
includes detailed instructions for Sturla to surreptitiously communicate with the secretary of the 
Call Board in an attempt to get Stiles his old position back. The letter ends: 
If this can be arranged, you look out for a place to live at once, and if, 
when I get to Chicago, I hear that you have been bad or dissipated in any 
way, I’ll pound you black and blue [Italics in the original]. Now, please, 
honey, be a good girl, and I will stick to you for life. My God! I never 
knew how much I could love you. Please return the inclosed [sic] letter to 
me. Don’t take a drop of champagne any more than you would so much 
poison, and your lot shall be a happy one.82 
Stiles’ letters and the accompanying article accentuate the many ways in which he failed 
to embody Victorian ideals of manliness. Although male passions such as ambition and 
aggression had been given freer reign than in an earlier time, manhood was defined by one’s 
ability to properly channel such passions, which Stiles had clearly failed to do. Additionally, 
many readers likely saw Stiles not only as a man unable to control his aggression, but also unable 
to fulfill his gendered role due to a proclivity for gambling and drink. Although gambling was 
abundant in urban society, it did not align with moral imperative emphasized by Victorian social 
standards. The gambler was a threat to these ideals because he underscored a belief that luck 
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mattered, suggesting that net worth did not necessarily equate to moral worth. Victorians 
endorsed a culture of control, which promoted the self-made man—the obverse of the gambler—
as its hero. By contrast, the self-made man represented success through careful cultivation of 
Protestant virtues and a belief that material rewards align with ethical merits. In Stiles’ case, 
monetary worth clearly did not equate to morality. Stiles’ most egregious affront to Victorian 
ideals was quite possibly his repeated requests for money from Sturla. A Victorian man who 
became the financial dependent of a woman, not to mention a prostitute, was no man at all.83 
Within days of the murder, Stiles’ exploitation of his mistress for money came to light in 
the press. As a successful caller at the Board of Trade Stiles made a salary of $5,000, and it was 
not unusual for him to lose upwards of $2,000 in a horse race. Sturla maintained that over the 
years he had gambled away all of his money and thousands of dollars of her money as well.84 
Stiles and his ilk—sometimes referred to as “bloods”—were admonished in the papers. These 
were men of ample means who, according to one Chicago paper, “entice[d] into the whirl of their 
dissipation others who [were] not so fortunate in the possession of wealth.” Specifically, they 
targeted “abandoned” women who would keep them in funds by “surrender[ing] principle, 
decency, and honesty.” Of course, these abandoned women were compelled by their “weakness 
and misery,” and they “turn[ed] to these men as objects of special regard, and wast[ed] the love 
that nature places in every woman’s breast upon them.”85 The establishment of Stiles’ status as a 
libertine early on in the media was significant because the Chicago public would have been well 
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aware of the murder and character of the victim and defendant well before the trial even began in 
November. 
In these ways, the society that had created the nineteenth century model of the pure, 
passionless woman also invented new models for men, who were advised to practice restraint 
and limit incidences of sexual intercourse. Victorians deemed this to be more difficult for men 
than women because of man’s supposed deep-seated sexual appetite. However, sexually 
profligate males were not automatically excused for their behavior. As Robert Ireland points out, 
“part of the ideology of republican virtue that created the republican wife also conceived the 
anti-republican libertine whose seductions of once-virtuous women were described as the works 
of Satan.”86 However, a “male folk code” arose that complicated and undermined the theoretical 
model of the self-controlled virtuous male who fell from grace and became a libertine. This code 
dismissed sexual purity as a female characteristic and encouraged men to regularly make use of 
their sex organs in order to prove and preserve virility. Americans in the nineteenth century 
placed a higher premium on sexual virtue than at any time in their history. In order to protect 
notions of sexual propriety, Americans occasionally adopted extreme measures. By the time of 
the trial in 1882, a higher “unwritten” law had been invented that excused the murder of the 
libertine who had threatened the accepted sexual norms.87 
It was immediate public knowledge that Sturla had been a sex worker in Baltimore before 
she met Stiles. Despite this, Stiles’ apparent libertinism largely outweighed Theresa’s moral 
imperfections, and the Chicago press emphasized the spark of virtue that existed inside the heart 
of the young harlot. One reporter remarked, “Her manners and personal beauty always secured 
for her an eager following. Contrary to the habits of her class, however, she saved her earnings—
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hoarded them, in fact, to the dollar, and never drank or caroused.”88 O.E. Turner supposed that 
Sturla’s station in life was simply the result of having “naturally inherited the passions and 
peculiarities of the Italian people.”89 When Stiles picked her up at the age of sixteen, she was, 
Turner wrote, “an uncultured child of one of the most passionate races on the globe.”90 Victorian 
Americans had established a culture that emphasized sexual purity and stable marriages as the 
essence of social order. Fitting of that culture, debauched women were considered disgraced in 
the eyes of Victorian society and their lives were often considered worthless.  
The press and public reactions to Sturla’s case indicates the extent to which Victorian 
notions of class were bound by expectations of moral character and respectability. It also just 
how fragile this connection was, and that the public would align with a fallen woman when it 
became apparent that her man had abandoned his masculine responsibilities for immoral and 
licentious behavior. If newspaper reports are indicative of public opinion, Sturla’s case shows us 
that it was possible for a fallen woman to garner the support of community from the confines of a 
jail cell. By giving regular interviews and establishing Stiles’ history of abuse, Chicagoans saw 
not a mere harlot but a woman who had been disgraced by a man that betrayed his duty as a 
Victorian male. Although these sentiments came far from ensuring an acquittal in court, they 
would certainly be influential for Sturla’s establishment as a figure of sympathy as she prepared 
to enter court in November 1882. 
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CHAPTER II: “THE STORY OF HER SUFFERINGS” 
In the months preceding her trial, the press had painted conflicting pictures of the woman 
who killed Charles Stiles. The opening statements of the defense and prosecution represented 
these two versions in starkly contrasting ways, both sides using Sturla as a symbol of major 
social issues of the day. For the state, the Sturla-Stiles relationship as a whole was “a standing 
menace to public morals,” and Sturla herself represented wanton sexuality, impiety, and the 
horrors associated with free love.91 For the defense and those who openly supported Sturla 
during the trial, she was clearly a victim of male perfidy, lust, and power. Previous 
dysmenorrhea-insanity cases confirmed the belief among medical professionals that a woman 
who suffered seduction, desertion, or disappointed affection at the hands of a man was likely to 
exhibit signs of insanity. Giving credence to the defense, doctors recognized as experts on 
insanity testified that the behavior of the defendant was proof that women’s biology created 
inherent mental instability that could easily lead to weakened morals and violent conduct. 
Medical professionals in court established a biological understanding of insanity, which was 
mirrored by lay-witness testimonies that attested to Sturla’s peculiar behavior considered to be 
clear indications of madness. These notions conflicted with legal understandings of moral 
culpability, which were grounded in Enlightenment ideas of free will and individual agency. The 
male jury ultimately sympathized with Sturla, who found herself at the crossroad between 
competing discourses about crime, insanity, and her own biology.  
Moreover, Sturla’s trial reveals that conceptions of insanity and criminality were defined 
by gendered cultural norms of the era. The Victorian ethos about gender and sexuality shaped 
understandings of criminal insanity among the medical community and the public in general. 
Earlier notions of hysteria as a characteristically female condition transformed into a 
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pathological disorder in the form of dysmenorrheal insanity. While alienists debated amongst 
themselves the nuances of what constituted various forms of insanity, some defense attorneys 
saw the medical establishment’s naturalistic, biological interpretation of criminals on trial as a 
way to bolster their cases and justify their clients’ actions through the authority of science. 
However, the belief among alienists that homicidal insane persons lacked free ran counter to how 
American legal professionals interpreted criminality. As we shall see, this rift between the 
medical and legal establishments became an issue in Sturla’s trial, as it led Judge Gardner to 
formally disassociate the insanity argument from the overall defense in the form of his 
instructions to the jury. 
 Prior to the nineteenth century, trials followed an inquisitorial form in which the judge 
attempted to extract the truth from the person on trial. The newly developed adversarial system 
of opposing council was characterized by the presentation of contrasting images of the 
defendant. In an attempt to make sense of competing narratives, nineteenth century lawyers often 
employed sentimental theatre, using dramatic flourishes that were likely to have an emotional 
impact on the jury.92 In the case of the Stiles murder, Theresa Sturla enthusiastically played the 
role expected of a Victorian murderess. Women on trial made particularly compelling 
“characters” for the men who were to judge them. Victorian-era murderesses were commonly 
depicted in multiple, conflicting ways. As Mary S. Hartman notes, “In their own time, the lady 
killers of the Victorian era, whether excused or vilified, were almost never presented as the 
women they were. They assumed multiple identities fashioned by both themselves and by 
others.”93 The prosecuting attorney fashioned Sturla as a woman of “appalling nature” akin to 
Eve, who had employed subtle cunning in her “unfaltering resolution to make [Stiles’] death 
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certain.”94 Sturla’s lawyer, in turn, described a delicate young woman who had been a victim not 
only of her abuser, but also of a malformed society that exiled innocent female victims of 
debauchees and libertines, driving them to suicide or even worse—to a life of prostitution.95 
In insanity cases such as Sturla’s, the display of contrasting personalities of the defendant 
was a key factor in whether or not a jury would find him or her guilty. During trials in which the 
guilt of the defendant was undisputed, lawyers could not hope to create alternate suspects or 
prove the absolute innocence or their client, which forced the jury to rely on the depiction of 
character and the conduct of the defendant to reach their verdict. In the case of female 
defendants, however, defense attorneys often played on the all-male jury’s sense of chivalry and 
their inclination to protect weak and fragile women. Sturla’s trial also took place during a time in 
which law enforcement and legal professionals argued that the criminal law must protect the 
innocent from the violence around them. As Jeffrey Adler observed, these sentiments likely 
encouraged jurors to view habitually battered women as sympathetic defendants who deserved 
legal protection.96 
 Whether or not they realized it at the time, the jury in Sturla’s trial had a historically 
unique case on their hands. Sturla’s actions stood out among those of other Chicago women 
murderers, and her story was distinctive among the few dysmenorrheal insanity cases that had 
preceded it. While the particulars varied, each of the defendants in these cases had been deemed 
respectable and pure before becoming involved with their paramours. Their attorneys were able 
to convince the jury that their clients were despoiled maidens, seduced and betrayed by men who 
                                                
94 Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 89. 
95 Carole Haber, The Trials of Laura Fair: Sex, Murder, and Insanity in the Victorian West, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 1-10. 
96 Jeffrey S. Adler, “’I loved Joe, but I had to Shoot Him’: Homicide by Women in Turn-of-the Century 
Chicago.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 92, no. 3/4 (Spring-Summer 2002): 
886. 
42 
had taken advantage of their delicate sensibilities. What, then, was a jury to do with the fallen 
woman in front of them; a maiden who had already been spoiled by the time she met her lover at 
the age of sixteen? 
Committing the murder in the first place made Sturla a moral alien in the eyes of the 
court and of society. Utilizing the insanity defense made her a mental alien on top of that. 
Finally, by conflating Sturla’s menstruation and biology with her alleged insanity, she became a 
sexual alien. For nineteenth century audiences, criminal women in general displayed traits 
inconceivable in a true woman, making Sturla’s actions and behavior culturally 
incomprehensible.97 In order to make sense of the murder, it was critical for the defense to 
convince the jury that Sturla had been the victim throughout, and even before, her relationship 
with Stiles and that killing him was an act of desperation and self-preservation. Although she 
was not fully acquitted, the jury’s verdict indicates that they saw past Sturla’s fallen status, 
instead viewing her not only as a lifelong victim of poor circumstances who deserved a chance at 
moral rehabilitation, but also as a sympathetic figure who could not be held responsible for her 
crime and deserving of legal protection at the hands of men more responsible than the debauchee 
that had wronged her. 
Sturla’s trial also took place at a unique time in the criminal history of Chicago. Jeffrey S. 
Adler has found that turn-of-the-twentieth century Chicago saw a significant rise in the levels of 
violence perpetrated by women. This is because gender roles loosened for habitually abused 
wives, as the violence perpetrated against them largely excused their own violent behavior as 
deserved retribution.98 Although Sturla and Stiles were never married, they clearly had a long-
term relationship and recognized each other in public as husband and wife. Therefore, it is useful 
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to compare her circumstances to that of a battered wife at that place and time in history, as hers 
was clearly a shared experience by a great many Chicago murderesses. Sturla was one of 325 
women who committed murder in Chicago between 1875-1920, which accounted for 6.5% of all 
homicides in that period. Men obviously accounted for the vast majority of murders in the city at 
this time, but it is worth noting that women claimed more lives than Chicago policeman during 
the era.99 Women killed at only one-fifteenth the rate of men, most often killing relatives or 
suitors. Moreover, three-quarters of husband killers used firearms to slay their spouses.100 The 
overwhelming use of firearms indicates that battered women chose their murder weapon for its 
ability to largely make up for disadvantages in size and strength. In most of these cases, women 
bought or borrowed weapons, made post-murder arrangements, and openly planned to employ 
the unwritten law when they inevitably got to court. Women killers also seldom struck in public 
settings or expressed remorse. Husbands and lovers were often killed at home, many times while 
they slept. Women generally expressed relief and even occasionally expressed joy after ridding 
themselves of their abusers. 101 
Superficially, it would appear that Sturla followed the format for what Chicagoans would 
have expected of a woman murderer at the time. After all, she had murdered her lover with a 
revolver purchased just that morning, and witnesses heard her saying after the murder, “I came 
here to do this.”102 The prosecution used these facts as evidence to argue that Sturla’s actions 
were premeditated and that she deserved to hang for them. As the story progressed, however, 
Chicagoans learned that the perpetrator of the Stiles murder broke the mold of their city’s 
murderesses in a number of ways. For one, the Palmer House was (and still remains) one of the 
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city’s most popular high-end hotels; she could hardly have chosen a less private venue to commit 
a murder. Aside from the sensation of the crime occurring in such a heavily trafficked 
establishment, Sturla’s reaction to the murder likely stood out to Chicago audiences. Her initial, 
remorseless comments aligned with the characteristics of typical women murderers at the time. 
However, as newspaper interviews and her legal defense indicated, she confessed that she still 
loved Stiles and never wanted to kill him, but she had to in order to save her own life. The shock 
and anguish Sturla expressed regarding her own crime throughout the trial likely went a long 
way in convincing the jury that she had not killed maliciously. Her actions were to be seen as a 
necessary solution to the terrifying problem of living with an abusive libertine. As the defense 
would argue, this solution was reached not by a woman of sound mind. Rather, Sturla’s attorney 
claimed, her lover’s physical and emotional treatment had exacerbated her dysmenorrhea, which 
ultimately caused a fit of maniacal fury that led to his demise. 
On the national stage, a handful of dysmenorrhea-induced insanity cases had preceded 
Sturla’s that emphasize the possibility of murderous women securing vindication: Mary Harris in 
1865; Laura Fair in 1870; Fanny Hyde in 1872; and Lastencia Abarta in 1881—whose trial took 
place just a few months before Sturla murdered Stiles. The defense counsels for each of these 
women made a similar argument as Sturla’s attorney. But in terms of an effort to successfully 
avoid the noose and attain moral vindication, Sturla was fighting an uphill battle from the 
moment she pulled the trigger. These four women were all certainly of the working class, but, as 
noted, Sturla was the only one who had fallen even before becoming involved with her 
paramour, making the possibility of being absolved in the eyes of society that much more 
difficult.103 
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The most celebrated and significant of these cases was that of Mary Harris, a twenty-two 
year old woman from Chicago by way of Iowa who assassinated her former fiancé Adoniram J. 
Burroughs in January 1865. Burroughs had seduced Harris only to break off their engagement, 
desert her in Chicago, and leave for a job at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. This prompted 
Harris to follow Burroughs to the capital and shoot him in the back while he sat at his office 
desk. In her trial six months later, her lawyers relied heavily upon an insanity defense. They 
argued that Harris’ temporary insanity was rooted in the tragic desertion she had experienced, 
but was compounded by her troubled menses. Harris’ attorney went so far as to assert that 
Burroughs’ breach of the promise of marriage to Harris represented “conduct…more injurious to 
morality than murder” and was therefore “worthy of the punishment of death…”104 Obvious 
premeditation on the part of Harris aside—significantly more so than in Sturla’s case—the 
argument ultimately won an acquittal and established a precedent for Sturla’s trial seventeen 
years later.  
Although the jury had accepted the version of Victorian ethics presented by the Harris’ 
lawyers, the New York Times interpreted the defense rather differently: 
The verdict only furnishes a new illustration of what must be regarded as a settled 
principle in American law—that any woman who considers herself agrieved (sic) 
in any way by a member of the other sex, may kill him with impunity, and with an 
assured immunity from the prescribed penalties of the law. The man may really 
have been guilty neither of a crime against her person, an assault upon her honor, 
nor an offence against her feelings; if she is seized by a fancy that his course of 
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conduct toward her is not such as she had anticipated from his addresses, she may 
kill him upon notice or without notice.105 
The controversy stirred by Harris’ acquittal did not exist solely in the media, but among circles 
of physicians recognized as eminent authorities on insanity as well. Dr. John P. Gray, editor of 
The American Journal of Insanity, wrote an article in that publication responding to the outcome 
of the Harris trial. Gray argued that Harris was not insane, but merely hysterically vengeful when 
she killed Burroughs. He admitted that “the sudden suppression of discharge [or] the puerperal 
state” might well be causes of mental disease, but “neither dysmenorrhea nor disappointed 
affection are of this class.”106  
One of the nation’s most renowned alienists, Dr. Isaac Ray, challenged this assertion in 
the article, “The Insanity of Women Produced by Desertion or Seduction,” which was 
specifically written in support of the opinion in the Harris case. Ray asserted Mary Harris had 
been deserted, which was “the heaviest blow that a proud and sensitive woman could receive,” 
resulting in a change of character to take place:  
“[The] effects of the moral shock were intensified by a considerable degree of 
uterine derangement, and rendered somewhat periodical and paroxysmal in their 
manifestations. Her mind thus unsettled, and drifting about under the impulse of 
every morbid feeling, was finally led to contemplate the idea of murder, and, after 
accomplishing the act, to regard her conduct with no very definite sentiment of 
joy or of sorrow—with no realizing sense of the enormity of her crime or of its 
legal consequence to herself.”107 
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While some may have described the Harris case as a cautionary tale, the argument of insanity 
produced by difficult menstruation was apparently convincing enough for the medical 
community and society at large.  
The disagreement between doctors Ray and Gray over the Harris case is representative of 
a larger debate that had been waging for decades among insanity experts. Throughout the first 
three decades of the century, medical literature reflected a growth of thought about insanity in 
Europe and the United States. French clinicians such as Philippe Pinel were some of the first to 
make real scientific efforts toward understanding mental diseases and the earliest American 
literature on insanity consisted mainly of summaries of French and British publications. Pinel’s 
publication of Traité medicophilosophique sur l’alienation mentale ou la manie 
(Medicophilosphical treatise on mental alienation or mania) in 1801 represented the application 
of clinical empiricism to psychiatry, introducing ideas that were disseminated widely in the 
United States and Great Britain following its translation to English in 1806. Isaac Ray and other 
pioneer American alienists cited Pinel and his French followers, often using their own cases to 
corroborate the observations of their European counterparts.108 
Pinel argued that dangerousness was one critical feature of certain types of insanity and 
believed it was necessary to recognize potentially dangerous lunatics and have a method of 
preventing harm. He classified forms of mental derangement as defects of the intellect, the 
passions, and the will. Derangement of the intellect was termed “Melancholia,” represented in 
patients who were “deluded and dangerous beings who can commit most barbarous homicides in 
cold blood.” In some cases a lunatic exhibited no defect in intellect, but was prone to fits of 
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maniacal fury, a condition Pinel referred to as “mania without delirium.” 109 These patients were 
considered the most dangerous because they did not exhibit intellectual derangement and were 
largely unpredictable. One area in which not all physicians accepted Pinel’s authority was in the 
relationship between reason and responsibility. Pinel contended that some lunatics could reason 
logically and yet were unable to control the passions or the will.110  
American physician Theodric Romeyn Beck relied on Pinel’s ideas about medical care 
and moral treatment of insane persons, arguing in 1811 that involuntary commitment of lunatics 
was necessary for the security of the public and for proper treatment of the patient. While Beck 
did not presume that all lunatics were dangerous, he did believe they were “all more or less 
liable” to commit crimes for which they could not be held responsible.111 Celebrated civic leader, 
politician, and physician Benjamin Rush was one of the first American medical men to 
specifically cite impairment of moral faculties as a symptom of insanity. Although 
dangerousness was not an overt theme in his Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the 
Diseases of the Mind (1812), he did predict the potential for dangerousness in cases of a 
condition he called manalgia, one form of “general intellectual derangement.” According to 
Rush, manalgia caused moral faculties to become impaired and made patients mischievous or 
vicious. Rush also considered murder and theft as derangement of the will: “When the will 
becomes the involuntary vehicle of vicious actions, through the instrumentality of the passions, I 
have called it Moral Derangement.” Emphasizing a growing attitude of the medical 
establishment’s absolute authority, Rush declared that the crimes of murder and theft were 
symptoms of disease and that they should be “rescued” from the law by “the kind and lenient 
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hand of medicine.”112 In spite of corroboration by other clinicians in years to follow, the ideas of 
“partial” and “moral” insanity were controversial well into the twentieth century. This was 
certainly true in the early part of the nineteenth century, as the notion that a person could behave 
normally and yet have thoughts and feelings that might overpower logic and reason defied the 
Enlightenment way of thinking.113 
The first alienist to identify “moral insanity” as a distinct illness was British physician 
James Cowles Prichard in 1835. According to Prichard, the critical feature of the phenomenon 
was that feelings were not controlled by the intellect: “The sudden anger of a person laboring 
under moral insanity, and subject to paroxysms of rage…[was] an immediate impulse arising 
spontaneously on the mind, which was diseased only in its moral constitution.”114 Isaac Ray, 
who became one of the most important figures in nineteenth century forensic psychiatry, agreed 
with Prichard’s ideas that corruption of moral faculties could occur in the presence of adequate 
intelligence. Ray expanded on Prichard’s work by introducing a framework that declared there 
were multiple moral faculties, and the degree of dangerousness in the morally insane person 
depended upon which of these faculties was involved in the pathology.115 
While Ray’s early work was significant as a synthesis of prevailing ideas about insanity 
in France and England at the time, it also reflects the inconsistencies of disease classification and 
the failure of physicians to reach an agreement about basic issues in medical jurisprudence. 
Experts generally agreed on the concepts of partial insanity but speculated over whether the 
intellect could remain intact in any cases of insanity. Alienists were also divided in their efforts 
                                                
112 Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind, 2nd ed. 
(Philadelphia, 1818), 181-183. 
113 Colaizzi, Homicidal Insanity, 17-18. 
114 James Cowles Prichard, A Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind (London, 
1835), 112. 
115 Colaizzi, Homicidal Insanity, 27-29. 
50 
to legally differentiate between the homicidal insane and the mere criminal. Some physicians 
judged insane persons qualitatively, believing that insanity was limited to individual mental 
faculties. Others made quantitative assessments, considering insanity in terms of degree rather 
than kind.116 Conflicting methods of determining dangerousness highlighted the medical 
establishment’s inability to reach a theoretical consensus, which propelled the belief among 
some alienists that no legal test for insanity existed. 
The issue of insanity among women was an additional source of tension for medical men. 
Hysteria and insanity induced by dysmenorrhea—both disorders that Theresa Sturla allegedly 
exhibited—represented methods of control over Victorian female behavior. While hysteria and 
insanity were not technically diseases reserved for women, nineteenth century physicians 
reported that urban women between the ages of fifteen and forty and of the middle and upper-
classes were affected far more often than men. The male medical community’s ambivalence 
toward women patients was especially true in cases of hysteria, mirroring the hostile view of 
hysterical women held by a significant portion of society that was enforced by cultural and social 
norms. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has argued that this resentment in the minds of physicians 
emanated from the relation between their categorizing of hysteria as a disease and the social role 
of women. For them, a hysterical woman was a biologically and socially dysfunctional woman 
who threatened physicians both as professionals and as rejected men. According to Smith-
Rosenberg, the physician of a hysterical woman “was the therapist thwarted, the child untended, 
the husband denied nurturance and sex.”117 
While the medical community argued amongst themselves, they also clashed with legal 
professionals in the courtroom. Conflicting theories of deviance between the two professions was 
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sparked by an attempt made by medical men to formally reinterpret the concept of human 
responsibility. The traditional, Enlightenment way of determining deviance was through the 
concept of free will. American law assumed that individuals were free agents capable of 
distinguishing right from wrong. If a defendant lacked the fundamental ability to tell whether his 
or her actions were wrong, they would be excused from responsibility. Conversely, medical 
theorists held a deterministic view of human behavior that was rooted in biology. Rather than the 
agents of free will the law supposed individuals to be, proponents of the naturalistic medical 
model—Isaac Ray included—viewed people as organisms subject to physical derangement. As 
John Starrett Hughes observed in his extensive study of Ray’s work, the conflict between the 
medical and legal establishments represented a foundational difference in opinion of law’s 
importance in the community.118 It is in this context, then, that Theresa Sturla first took her seat 
in the Criminal Court of Cook County on November 21, 1882. 
In many ways, Theresa Sturla’s trial follows the formula of nineteenth century unwritten 
law cases extremely closely. In his opening statement, the prosecuting attorney, L.L. Mills, 
argued Sturla “was not, and is not insane,” and that “her every act indicated deliberation.” He 
warned the jury not to be “diverted by any sentimentality” merely because there was a woman on 
trial.119 Theresa’s attorney, A.S. Trude, contrasted Mills’ depiction of his client with a dramatic 
flourish, telling the court that the entire history of Sturla and Stiles’ relationship was “written in 
tears and blood—her tears and her blood.”120 He explained how Stiles had “gained complete 
control of the Italian girl” in Baltimore, and established the victim’s character and pattern of 
abusive behavior toward Sturla. He then explained that she was the victim of a medical condition 
called dysmenorrhea: 
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From the time she emerged from girlhood into womanhood, she has been the 
victim of suppressed or difficult menstruation, the seriousness of her condition 
was intensified by the brutal treatment she endured at the hands of Stiles, and 
from the periods when she has her menses, she is deranged. When he adds fresh 
acts of brutality upon her when she is menstruating, she is wildly insane. 
Trude concluded his opening statement by explaining that he would bring to the stand character 
witnesses who were “well known and reputable persons,” ultimately showing “acts of brutality, 
which [are] a predisposing cause of insanity, from the time of the last mentioned act up to about 
July 5th, 1882, by police officers, citizens and carriage drivers.”121  
 True to form for unwritten law cases, the defense introduced a host of lay witnesses who 
confidently declared that they believed Sturla to have been insane when she killed Stiles, most of 
whom recounted instances of the defendant in conditions of high agitation.122 Rosa Ashton, a 
housekeeper in the building where Sturla and Stiles kept an apartment together, described 
Sturla’s behavior on the occasions she had her “monthly sickness.” She said that when Sturla 
“had her ‘monthlies’ and had trouble with [Charlie] besides, she was always in great pain and 
was not right in the head.”123 The matron of the Cook County jail, Augusta Papendeick, had 
observed the defendant for several months at that point and described some of Sturla’s unusual 
behavior: “[Sturla] would kneel down after surrounding herself with candles and pray; then she 
would suddenly jump up and sing, then laugh and as suddenly cry. At other times she would take 
[Stiles’] picture and say she would like to…dig up his bones and have them near to her.” 
Papendeick also claimed that “at times her face looked unnatural, and the pupils of her eyes were 
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dilated.” Upon cross-examination by the prosecution, she said with authority she did not “think 
that [Sturla was] pretending or following out a line of defense marked by her attorney.”124 
 Other witnesses attested to the abusive nature of the relationship, an important factor in 
the formula that led to Sturla’s alleged insanity. Frederick E. Davis said that he spoke with Stiles 
at Downing’s the day before the murder when the couple were there having dinner. Davis 
confronted Stiles and told him that he heard he “treat[ed] her badly.” To this Stiles replied, “The 
more I thump her the better she likes me.”125 William A. Pinkerton of the Pinkerton Detective 
Agency testified as to what he observed two years prior to the murder. After a particularly heated 
fight, Sturla had a basket “consisting of layers of rotten potatoes, decayed cabbages, old onions, 
set off on the top by a large beet marked ‘Charles Stiles’” sent to the Board of Trade while he 
was working. Stiles was so embarrassed and enraged by this that he hired the Pinkertons to 
confront Sturla “to induce her to let him alone in the future.” After hearing about the abuse that 
she regularly endured, Pinkerton suggested she might leave Stiles with the aid of the police. A 
few weeks later Pinkerton checked up on Sturla at her home and was surprised to find that Stiles 
was still there. During that visit, Stiles attempted to strike Sturla with a water pitcher but was 
stopped by Pinkerton. Sturla “acted unnatural” and told the detective “Charlie had hoodooed 
her.” She talked about destiny and fate bringing them together, to which Pinkerton retorted, 
“Destiny and fate would separate them with a bloody hand.”126  
One of the most damning of the character witness testimonies came from Miss Carrie 
Watson, madam of the popular brothel where Stiles had forced Theresa to work during periods in 
which he was especially low on cash. Stiles first brought Theresa to her house about two and a 
half years prior to the murder. One evening, Watson said, Stiles drunkenly broke through the 
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door of Sturla’s room and “got into a scuffle, when he fell down the stairs.” Another time, 
Watson caught Stiles hiding in a closet, waiting for Theresa to give him the money she made that 
day. Finally, she confirmed for the court that when Sturla “had her ‘monthlies’ and was vexed at 
something Charlie did to her, she was very bad and seemed out of her mind.”127 
 Over the course of the nearly three week trial, thirteen reputable physicians known to be 
experts on insanity enhanced these lay witness testimonies. These expert witnesses served to 
provide medical theories that would corroborate the behavior of the defendant as insane, 
supporting theoretical pronouncements with specific and impressive symptoms of insanity.128 
This practice had become the norm for trials in which the defendant’s sanity was in question, 
giving the medical community an active role in jurisprudence. The existence of “experts” on 
insanity was a new phenomenon in and of itself: it was only recently that the insane, once 
chained and hidden from view, were unbound and placed in special hospitals run by doctors 
dedicated to studying their disease. As the leading alienist of the day, Dr. Isaac Ray led the 
charge in attempting to define the role of doctors in the courtroom, bringing scientific values to 
the law that often challenged the values of legal professionals. While lawyers looked backward 
by celebrating precedent, doctors tended to look forward to utilizing the progression of science to 
solve legal matters.129 
The first physician to take the stand was Dr. James H. Bates, who had had Theresa as a 
patient for three years at that point. He treated her once when Stiles had knocked her tooth out 
and another occasion when she had been kicked in the side. Bates claimed that Sturla’s 
“excitement was variable, severe when she claimed to have been mistreated just before, often 
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almost delirious…There were all the conditions present that might produce homicidal mania.” 
On the day of the murder, Bates had examined Sturla at the police station after her arrest and 
confirmed that “she was sick—had her menses…[and] must have had them the night before.” 
Considering the circumstances around the murder, Bates said, “All things that she suffered are 
predisposing causes of insanity, and when all those causes were combined in one person, and 
that person a woman, sanity would be the exception and insanity the rule.”130 As the court would 
see, Bates was the first of many doctors to apply common medical conceptions of femininity and 
female biology to Theresa Sturla.  
Although medical and biological justification for the roles assigned to women was 
nothing new at this point in history, it took on a new form in the nineteenth century as the 
intellectual and emotional supremacy of science increased. Scientific arguments were used in 
nearly all aspects of Victorian life, but especially in areas in which it might challenge social 
arrangements and affect social change.131 Medical orthodoxy of the time insisted that women 
were starkly different than the male of the species. In a physical sense, women were more frail 
and delicate. More significantly, the female nervous system was inherently more irritable than 
that of the male, prone to overstimulation and exhaustion. Physicians also saw women as 
prisoners of their reproductive systems, which dictated her social role and behavior from puberty 
through menopause.132 As George Man Burrows wrote in 1828, even those doctors “of the least 
experience” should be aware of the influence that menstruation has on the mind, and recognize it 
as the “moral and physical barometer of the female constitution.”133 It is little wonder, in the eyes 
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of contemporary observers, that a woman like Sturla would be unable to distinguish morality 
from deviance. 
 On the day following Bates’ testimony when another doctor—Thomas Schmidt—was on 
the stand, Sturla’s attorney put forth a long-winded “hypothetical” question. The question 
amounted to a summary of the abuse his client had endured over the course of the last five years 
and a description of the events that had transpired the night before the murder, culminating in the 
death of Stiles on July 10. Trude concluded his question by asking Dr. Schmidt if he would 
consider Sturla legally insane or not when she fired the shot.134 “I should certainly consider her 
insane,” Schmidt replied. “It is impossible for a woman to be in the condition described and not 
be mentally affected. Not only that, but the very fact that a woman should subject herself to the 
brutalities named, so long, I should regard as a very strong addition of proof.”135 Later the same 
day, Dr. Daniel R. Bower, the former superintendent of an insane asylum in Illinois, confirmed 
for Trude that brutality inflicted for five years is certainly a predisposing cause of insanity 
among women. Upon being asked if he had ever had any cases that he treated with regard to 
menstrual difficulty, Bower answered: 
A young lady patient has to be constantly watched upon every occasion of her 
periods, for fear that she will commit homicide. The relations that the sexual 
organs bear to the home of thought—the brain—is very close and intimate, and 
when it is shown that this young woman had this disease, dysmenorrhea, and was 
menstruating on the night of July 9th when in an excitable frame of mind…she 
would be a wonder if she preserved her equilibrium.136 
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Dr. Henry Lyman confirmed that “disorders of sexual organs are frequent causes of insanity in 
women,” and that he had “never read so severe a case of hysterics as that shown in this case.”137  
 On day twelve, Theresa Sturla took the witness stand to give her testimony. Throughout 
her trial Sturla had been somber, clad in a black dress and a veil that obscured her face, exposing 
only small curls of dark hair—her “widow’s locks.”138 As she sat facing the audience in the court 
for the first time, her face was pale and her forehead “slightly wrinkled with a frown of 
thoughtfulness or pain.” She held a white handkerchief that she frequently applied to her eyes 
and nervously twirled in her fingers. “With every eye in the court-room on her, and every ear 
intent on each syllable, she began the story of her sufferings.”139 Sturla proceeded to regale the 
court with the origins of her relationship with Stiles and over a dozen instances of the physical 
and emotional abuse she had suffered. A number of Sturla’s vignettes involved Stiles requesting 
money and threatening her when she would not give it to him. On one such occasion, Sturla had 
refused to give Stiles the $350 she made from selling furniture from her old apartment: 
It was nighttime and we stood on the railing of [a] boat, and he said that he had a 
good notion to throw me into the river. I said that would be murder and he would 
be hung. He said it was not murder to kill a prostitute; that there was no law for 
them, and that it was no crime to kill one. I took out my pistol and told him to 
keep away, which he did. On our way home we made up and I went back to 
Watson’s. He began coming to the house drunk.140 
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 A particularly sensational climax of the testimony came when Sturla recounted the events 
of July 9 and 10. According the Chicago Times, she began to sob and got “wilder and wilder at 
every word,” evidently making an emotional appeal to many in attendance: 
During these last words of her testimony, when her heart seemed breaking and the 
spectators were all shading their eyes, Mr. Trude, the attorney for the defense, 
rose from his seat, and withdrawing from where the jury could see his face, he 
stood dazed, the tears rolling down his cheeks and his lips quivering with 
sympathetic emotion. He was not the only one. There was many a strong man 
doing the same.141 
As she described the moments before the murder, Theresa’s face was in her hands, her breast 
heaved, and violent sobs broke between her words. She cried, “I killed him!” and suddenly went 
into a frenzy. According to the Chicago Times reporter present, “She rose spasmodically from 
her seat, clutched the air and fell to the floor…scream after scream came from her throat, and 
four bailiffs rushed to her. These four strong men were powerless to control that girlish form as 
she struggled and tore at her breast.” Sturla was forcibly removed from the courtroom while “she 
gnashed her teeth and bit at her captors, until partially exhausted from her frenzied efforts and 
screams.”142 Dr. A. Reeves Jackson—whom the prosecution had called earlier as a witness 
against Sturla—examined her after she was removed from court, confirming that she had 
“suffered from a very pronounced attack of hysteria” and refuted insinuations that she had been 
feigning.  
 Records show that two of the twelve jurors at Sturla’s trial had openly expressed biases 
against the defendant during the jury selection process, having stated they were for conviction 
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and capital punishment. A.S. Trude attempted to get these two jurors excluded from the jury on 
the third day of the trial but the Court declined, ruling that the jurors had been accepted and 
sworn in and could not be excused.143 On the morning of December 18 in a packed courtroom, 
the jury returned with a compromised verdict finding Sturla guilty of manslaughter with a one-
year prison term, “the lowest known to law,” according to Judge George Gardner. Given the 
precedent set by Mary Harris and the course of events during trial, it is reasonable to assume that 
Sturla would have walked out of the courthouse a free woman had the biased jurors been excused 
as per Trude’s request. Although it was not an acquittal, Theresa listened to the verdict with a 
smile on her face and with an “ironical accent and contemptuous curl of the lips,” she addressed 
the court, thanking the efforts of the judge, jury, and her attorney.144 As the Times reported, 
“When the Court concluded she with an elastic step went back to jail.”145 
 In unwritten law cases in which insanity was a central issue, the prosecution and defense 
sometimes disputed which side had the burden of proof. In Sturla’s case, Judge Gardner’s 
instructions fall in line with those of most judges in his position, who generally ruled that 
defendants were presumed sane in the eyes of the law. Therefore, the burden of proof was on the 
defense, but the jury must acquit if the defendant’s proof created reasonable doubt of his or her 
sanity. Since the defense could rather easily create uncertainty by calling witnesses to verify 
alleged insanity, judges instructed juries that they had to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was sane at the time of the murder in order to render a verdict of guilty. This 
instruction that typically benefitted the defendant, especially when coupled with permissive 
definitions of insanity.146  
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 What is most striking about Gardner’s instructions is that he effectively eliminated 
insanity from the overall defense, instructing the jury, “What constitutes legal insanity is a 
question purely of law and fact and in determining this question the jury are not to be governed 
by the opinion of any medical expert, but are to decide the case according to the law of this state 
and the evidence in the case.”147 With these directives, the jury was to view the case strictly from 
a self-defense standpoint. Moreover, Gardner completely shut down the biological deterministic 
view of crime that physicians had brought to his courtroom. In this way, he reinforced the 
traditional attitude held by American legal professionals that revolved around free will. As the 
following chapter will show, this did not necessarily hurt Sturla’s chances of avoiding capital 
punishment. Rather, her attorney adopted rhetoric of moral reform in order to exonerate his 
client. 
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CHAPTER III: “GO THOU AND SIN NO MORE” 
Despite any complications biased jurors may have caused during the deliberations, the 
jury had decided Theresa Sturla was not the monster the prosecution had made her out to be and 
was deserving of an opportunity for redemption. The question is, what exactly gave them this 
impression? Sturla’s morality as it pertained to her womanhood became the main problem to be 
dealt with during the trial. Chicagoans devoured the sensationalism of an insanity plea but even 
that defense boiled down to a question of morals when the defense introduced the idea of moral 
insanity. This was problematic itself because physicians could not reach a consensus as to what 
exactly constituted temporary insanity or moral insanity. Remarkably, the insanity plea itself 
became a secondary issue behind morality, which was much more fiercely debated toward the 
end of trial and for the duration of Sturla’s prison sentence. While the jury and the public may 
not have been sure if the defendant was legitimately insane, they could certainly judge her moral 
fortitude and watched closely to see if this fallen murderess was actually capable of redeeming 
herself. Chicagoans were also reacting to growing concerns over the relationship between vice 
and class in the city, fearing that the pervasiveness of prostitution would destroy middle-class 
life and values. The public conversation around Theresa Sturla as a woman and as a murderer 
offers an example of the crisis of class and morals in Chicago that would lead to massive 
municipal reform within a few short decades. 
As events transpired in the courtroom, the public questioned Sturla’s inherent morality 
during the trial and continued to do so throughout her eleven months in prison. From the 
beginning of her trial, newspaper accounts constantly speculated two things about Theresa 
Sturla: whether or not she was insane; and whether or not she was capable of redemption if she 
was not convicted. Comments from the public and from reporters regarding the issue of insanity 
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generally mirrored what the physician witnesses discussed in court. The issue of redemption, 
however, was much more hotly debated. This fire was fueled by public support Sturla received 
from two very different well-known Chicago women, one of whom embodied vice, the other 
virtue. The support from Madame Carrie Watson and ardent reformer Mrs. Hortensia Black 
brought the debate over Sturla’s predisposition for virtue to the forefront of the public 
conversation for over a year, until she was released from prison in November 1883. By this time, 
it had become increasingly common for middle and upper class female moral reformers to cross 
class lines in order to fight for their fallen sisters. 
As early as the day after the murder, Chicago newspapers reported that Carrie Watson, 
Sturla’s employer and the operator of one of the city’s most popular upscale brothels, regularly 
visited Sturla in jail and was one of her closest friends in the wake of the murder. Writing in 
1894, British journalist and social reformer W.T. Stead referred to Watson as the best-known 
Madame in Chicago, who could charge top dollar as she was “at the head of her shameful 
profession.”148 Watson was well known in 1882, but became even more notorious in later years. 
For several years toward the end of the century, Watson hosted an annual party branded as a 
“benefit” for Lame Jimmy, the Madame’s house violinist. These extravagant, bacchanalian 
affairs were attended by a mixture of the demi-monde and businessmen and politicians who were 
friendly to the vice districts. Watson’s yearly benefit ended in 1894 when, during the festivities, 
“one of the best known police officers in Chicago was shot dead in the midst of the orgy.”149 
                                                
148 William T. Stead, If Christ Came to Chicago!, (London: The Review of Reviews, 1894), 237-239. 
Stead’s book was a reaction to his first visit to Chicago, in which he addressed what he considered to be 
rampant vice and immoral behavior on the part of its citizens. Working with other moral reformers in the 
city, the book paved the way for the formation of the Chicago Vice Commission and the closure of 
Chicago’s Levee district. 
149 Stead, If Christ Came to Chicago!, 239. 
63 
Carrie Watson’s presence was very likely a great personal comfort to Sturla, but she also 
aided the murderess when she preemptively bolstered the defense by informing reporters that 
Stiles had “shamefully abused” his mistress and “made her life miserable in many other ways.” 
In one interview, she confirmed that Sturla regularly carried a pistol in her pocket but did not 
believe she had intended to use it on Stiles that morning.150 Not only did Carrie Watson aid 
Sturla with moral support, she was also responsible for funding the defense. The Chicago Times 
reported that the “fallen angels on the ‘Levee’” had made a heroine of the murderess.151 Watson 
had begun raising funds for Sturla’s benefit by putting up $500 of her own money, which was 
soon matched by donations from other working girls. According to the report: “Among the demi-
monde the murder is still the all-absorbing theme of conversation. The women of the town 
discuss the details of the tragedy and relate incidents in connection with the lives of the victim 
and his murderess with morbid pleasure.”152  
Shortly after the trial, newspapers reported that when Sturla was arrested, she took 
somebody’s suggestion of sending for A.S. Trude, “the most successful lawyer in the city.” She 
told him she had no money but was in need of legal advice. Hearing her situation, he offered his 
services pro-bono. There would be other costs, however, and Carrie Watson ultimately put up 
$2,000 of her own money toward the defense. Sturla had the sympathy of other women “of her 
class,” who also contributed to the defense fund “until there was about $900 to supplement the 
$2000 of Mme. Watson.” All of this money was used to defray the costs of reimbursing 
witnesses for their travel and time and to hire a stenographer.153  
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While the Stiles murder may have been a cathartic moment for the city’s fallen women, 
their involvement in the matter inspired distrust toward the murderess. Some newspapers 
speculated that her account of the events leading up to the murder were not to be trusted. A 
Chicago Times editorial attacking Sturla entitled “Rampant Harlotry” said that “since the awful 
deed the fallen women have come out on the streets in force...they appear in bright colors and 
seem to feel triumphant over the matter.”154 Had this piece not been printed the murderess may 
never have gained a crucial ally, who would come to represent her propensity for virtue and 
redemption. 
Hortensia Black responded to the editorial, appalled at the unfair attack on Sturla and 
“[felt] called on to enter the lists in behalf of one who can not speak for herself.” Mrs. Black was 
the wife of W.P. Black, a prominent lawyer in Chicago who was best known for serving as 
defense council for the men accused of inciting the Haymarket Riot in 1886. The couple was 
well known for their involvement in the local temperance movement and other social reform 
activities. Mrs. Black was particularly vocal as a believer in faith healing and as a vegetarian and 
fierce advocate for animal welfare. An 1899 Tribune piece featuring Mrs. Black’s animal 
activism explained that she was a “reincarnationist” who believed that human souls pass on to 
animals after death.155 
In response to the article that attacked Sturla, Mrs. Black wrote a letter to the editor of the 
Times defending the womanhood of Sturla and her fallen sisters and blaming men for such tragic 
incidents. Mrs. Black declared that men had made women “cold and hard, and suspicious, and 
jealous” and they would not let men “mold [their] thoughts and opinions any more.” Horrified by 
the idea that a man would bet and pay bills on the earnings of a woman’s body, Mrs. Black 
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posited “the young woman did the natural, if not the right, thing when she shot her oppressor.” 
She went so far as to say that if Sturla were to be tried by a jury of women, they “would not be 
long in rendering our verdict” and “would desire, with feminine irrelevancy to tack on to [the] 
verdict some kind of provision for her.”156 Mrs. Black placed more blame on Stiles’ mother than 
she did Stiles himself, attacking her womanhood and questioning why she did not raise him 
better and why tears were “not shed over his sinning life instead of his, as it seems to an outsider, 
very fitting end.”157 It was the woman sitting in a jail cell, not her dead lover and his family who 
deserved to be pitied: 
“She may have callers and champagne, but oh! What has she beside? Remorse 
and the spectre of her dead unworthy love; an empty, hopeless life; the doors shut 
before and behind her; never a husband’s honoring touch, never the tender caress 
of a baby hand, none of life’s sweet and sacred cares! Shut out! Outcast!”158 
After Mrs. Black’s letter was printed in the Times, she became a regular visitor of Sturla’s during 
her time in jail. Reports circulated that she had vowed to take Theresa under her wing and do 
what she could to help her pursue her dreams of singing on stage. Mrs. Black and Carrie Watson 
each sat at the defendant’s side throughout the trial. 
This was not the first time a dysmenorrheal insanity case incited support from women 
who had never met the defendant, as a similar situation had arisen during the Mary Harris trial 
thirty years prior. After her arrest in Washington, Harris had little money and no friends or 
family for hundreds of miles. Luckily, newspaper accounts of her story made an impression on 
other women. A few local Washington women volunteered to run errands for Harris, while a pair 
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of sisters and some friends traveled from Wisconsin to testify on her behalf.159 Sturla’s situation 
was different, though. Mrs. Black’s involvement did not merely represent one woman’s 
sympathy for the defendant. When she was called as a character witness, Mrs. Black explained 
that she had taken an interest in Theresa “on account of her very sorrowful life,” and that her 
deportment was “singularly womanly, modest, and gentle.” With these words, Black granted 
Sturla sympathy based on her conformity to the ideals of true womanhood. Apparently she also 
had a close personal connection to the defense itself: “I lost one very dear person from 
dysmenorrhea. Another became incurably insane from the same cause. Another was only so 
every month. The case was very pitiful and sad, and she was a very lovely woman, but at such 
times she could not control herself.” The fact that an upper class, respectable woman saw the 
capacity for virtue in the heart of an Italian prostitute almost certainly affected the perception the 
public and jury had toward her. This sentiment was reinforced by Sturla’s declarations that when 
she was free, she planned go to live with Mrs. Black and study music. “When I can make an 
honest living with my music or any other way” she vowed after she was sentenced, “I will try to 
do it, but I will never go back to my old kind of life again.”160 Mrs. Black’s relationship with 
Sturla exemplifies the attitudinal changes toward the redemption of prostitutes that occurred in 
the nineteenth century. 
The Victorian code, firmly planted in middle class values, dictated that women who 
abandoned virtue had no place in society. These women were often cast not as fallen angels 
capable of redeeming their virtue, but rather evil temptresses or sirens of vice.161 These 
sentiments were perpetuated by regulations and criminal sanctions that condemned prostitutes. 
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Despite obvious male involvement in the exchange of money for sex, courts ruled that 
prostitution was a female offense. This helped in codifying the notion that female, but not male, 
promiscuity was tied to delinquency.162 When prostitution was becoming more visible in 
American urban centers in the early part of the nineteenth century, most complaints about the 
illicit sex trade arose on the grounds that it was a public nuisance.  
However, as Christian ministers and missionaries encountered prostitutes during outreach 
efforts, they were often moved to help the women and gradually equated prostitution to a 
problem of immorality. The first organized effort to reform fallen women was the Magdalen 
Society of New York, inspired by the work of Presbyterian minister Ezra Stiles Ely.163 Ely used 
sympathetic portrayals of prostitutes to change perceptions of fallen women and to persuade 
Christians to help rescue women from their lives of sin. In 1812, the Magdalen Society of New 
York established an asylum for penitent prostitutes that would afford them protection and 
support while they received religious, moral, and practical training that would give them the 
necessary tools for successful reformation. The ultimate hope of the society was for women to 
leave the asylum and reunite with family and friends or secure respectable employment.164 
Despite their best efforts, the Magdalen Society of New York only received a small number of 
“penitent prostitutes” in their asylum. Many women ended up running away or being dismissed 
and only a few were successfully reclaimed. In 1818, the asylum was closed, and the society 
ceased all operations. At the time, a number of missions, ministries, and benevolent societies 
existed that could offer assistance to fallen women, but none focused specifically on dealing with 
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prostitution directly. Nevertheless, the seed had been planted for private citizens to take up the 
fight for moral reform.165 
In the 1830s and 1840s, evangelical women in moral reform societies began to transform 
the social and political conversation around prostitution. Rather than place the blame on innocent 
women and punish them for “choosing” a life of vice, female moral reformers constructed new 
sexual politics around prostitution. They declared that prostitution was a by-product of male 
dominance in economic, political, and social life, and viewed the sexual double standard as an 
extension of the power imbalance between the sexes. By analyzing prostitution in the context of 
sexual exploitation, female moral reformers argued that prostitution was a result of male sexual 
aggressiveness and an expression of class and gender inequalities.166 
Christian female moral reformers in this way developed a gendered rhetoric that bound 
women together by their shared experiences and fostered a sisterhood centered on gender rather 
than class. In the effort to protect their sex, they argued that women had to align and force men 
to adopt the same codes of behavior that were applied to women. It is important to note that, 
while much of their rhetoric might be viewed as a precursor of modern feminism, these women 
did not identify as feminists. Although they placed the burden of responsibility for the double 
standard on men, they did not presume that women should take over or even share the sources of 
power in the legal, economic, and political arenas in which men dominated.167 Instead, they used 
the ideology of domesticity and assumptions of human sexuality to bolster their efforts. They 
accepted that women and men had different mental, moral, and sexual natures and therefore had 
different spheres of influence. A woman’s role was to be the supportive, chaste, self-sacrificing 
wife and mother bound by religion and the home. In those spheres her power should dominate all 
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others, including the men in the house. If public affairs were his, the world of private affairs 
would be hers.168 
The primary strategy of female moral reformers was to change the social perception of 
prostitutes and who was ultimately responsible for their moral downfall. In the eighteenth 
century, male fornicators were punished with a fine while their female partners were whipped. 
By the early nineteenth century, the gender and class bias toward moral offenders that had 
always existed became official policy. Technically, laws were not gendered and men and women 
could be charged with the same crimes of lewdness. In practice, however, there existed a double 
standard that increased the legal disparity between the genders. In Boston, for example, men 
constituted roughly one-fourth of all public lewdness cases in the early years of the century, a 
statistic that fell to about fifteen percent by 1840. In 1850, no men were charged with lewdness. 
Throughout this period, women were regularly charged with lewdness while their male 
counterparts went largely unpunished.169 In their effort to eliminate the double standard and 
persuade society to hold lascivious men accountable for their crimes, female moral reformers 
recast fallen women as the exploited and men as the exploiters. 
 An early issue of the American Female Moral Reform Society’s (AFMRS) bi-monthly 
periodical, the Advocate of Moral Reform (AMR), compared immoral American men to packs of 
mad dogs left unchecked to run the streets. Seeking to reach a Christian audience who would be 
horrified at society’s excessive licentiousness, the AMR and other moral reform publications 
were full of emotional allusions to the Bible. Comparing urban society to Sodom and Gomorrah, 
periodicals depicted profligate males as “villains,” “fiends,” and “fornicators.” The article in the 
AMR recognized that antagonizing the “mad pack” would likely make them “bark louder, and 
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bite harder,” but the women reformers believed this would be the way to shift public attention to 
the injustice of the double standard and hold men responsible for their actions. In the first issue 
of the AMR, readers were reminded: “No effort need be made to fasten disgrace upon the 
licentious woman; she is disgraced already, and effectually shut out from all communication with 
the virtuous of the other sex: but the licentious man, as guilty and polluted as the woman is still 
permitted to move in respectable society.”170  
The battle for morality that had been brewing throughout Stula’s trial came to a head 
during the defense and prosecution’s closing speeches. What is remarkable about the final 
addresses from both lawyers is the focus not on insanity, but on morality and notions of true 
womanhood. The winning argument from Sturla’s attorney, A.S. Trude, effectively employed the 
rhetoric that female moral reformers had utilized decades earlier to argue that all fallen women 
lost their virtue at the hands of licentious men. The closing statements given by Trude and state’s 
attorney Mills are highly significant in revealing the true nature of the Sturla trial. Officially, 
Trude employed a two-pronged defense of self-defense and insanity, but the overarching issue 
that becomes clear in the closing statements was one of morals. Prosecutor Mills reminded the 
jury in the initial closing remarks that for five years the couple had lived a “life of the most 
unholy character,” and that their relationship in general was a “standing menace to public morals 
and a constant violation of the law.”171 Despite this truth, Mills claimed, it was “voluntary” on 
the parts of Sturla and Stiles, making both parties equally responsible for their behavior. 
From the beginning of the defense’s closing speech, A.S. Trude echoed much of the 
frustrated and anger-fueled moral reform rhetoric of half a century earlier in his efforts to 
exonerate his client. Of course, he could not hope to convince the jury that Sturla was innocent, 
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but he could endeavor to morally exonerate her by establishing Stiles as the true criminal and 
Sturla his victim. According to Trude, Sturla was at a disadvantage from the moment Stiles first 
saw her as “a fresh victim of man’s lust” whose only offense “was in yielding to the strongest of 
all human passions under a promise of marriage made by our sex.” Naturally, the defense 
claimed, it was Sturla’s Italian heritage that predisposed her to succumbing to such passions. 
Italy, the “land of dreams, of poetry and romance,” is a place “so near the sun” that passions are 
intensified to such an extent that they often culminate in death. “Italian women,” Trude told the 
jury, “are creatures of passion and act from impulse rather than from reason, and that God made 
them such.” As a weak, frail, Italian woman whose passions and impulses were “incident to her 
nativity,” she could not be to blame.172 Stiles, on the other hand, had been brought up in an 
atmosphere of wealth, received an excellent education, and “possessed a degree of intelligence 
that bordered on genius.” Despite his fortunate upbringing, he became a “gambler by choice” and 
a “libertine from inclination,” “enter[ing] into a career that either ends in the penitentiary or the 
morgue.” As libertines are wont to do, Stiles falsely claimed his love for Sturla, as he was 
“incapable” of that particular emotion. Instead, Trude asserted, Stiles “regarded her as a gambler 
would a dice box—an agent to replenish his depleted pocket.”173  
After this introduction and a breakdown of their two-pronged defense, court was 
adjourned for the night. The following day, Trude resumed his speech. This second day of 
closing remarks is striking because as both attorneys made their addresses, it is apparent that 
their main goal was less about persuading the jury whether or not the defendant was insane, nor 
that she acted out of self-defense or premeditated her lover’s murder. Instead, the speeches made 
by both Trude and Mills were dominated by an argument over virtue and vice. Remarkably, the 
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only instance in which Trude so much as mentioned Sturla’s alleged insanity on the final day in 
court was in reference to the fact that she voluntarily maintained a relationship with a man who 
consistently beat her. Trude claimed this was so unnatural that the only explanation was 
insanity.174 
Trude framed his depiction of Sturla as the victim by explaining to the jury that she was a 
casualty of the immoral urban society in which they were all complicit. Such a society had given 
rise to the Owl Club, the fraternal organization of which Stiles was a member. Despite its 
founding by respectable men, Trude explained that when the organizers had retired they 
surrendered their membership to “a fourth-class consisting of rakes and libertines.”175 Appealing 
to the moral sensibilities of the court, the defense adopted a tone that sounded as if it could have 
been lifted from the pages of the Advocate of Moral Reform itself, claiming that members of the 
Owl Club and other men like them were a tremendous danger to the community and a “greater 
menace to society than professional criminals.”176 According to Trude, all of this was due to the 
malformation of society itself: 
“…for it visits all its venom on poor defenseless woman while her villainous 
betrayer treads ankle deep in the rich carpets of palatial mansions, his head 
unbowed in shame. The victim of his perfidy and lust, however, is exiled from 
society, banished from home and driven to a life of prostitution, and finally sleeps 
on the cold marble slab at the morgue. No woman becomes a prostitute except 
through the agency of our sex. Upon woman falls all the chances of exposure and 
shame, and she alone is made the sufferer.”177 
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Trude went on to tell the jury that its verdict was critical, as it would be a reflection of the true 
morals of society. If Sturla were convicted, they would “elate the vengeful members of the Stiles 
family, and the Owl Club and every pimp and libertine in the city [would] rejoice.” On the other 
hand, to acquit her would “send a thrill of joy and gladness into every home where virtue lives, 
and where vice may creep in to deceive and destroy.”178 
 The defense recognized that, at least for some members of the jury, the issues of insanity 
and self-defense were not nearly as straightforward as the debate over virtue and vice. Despite 
most expert witnesses confirming their belief that the defendant was unlikely to have been of 
sound mind at the time of the murder, the insanity defense was complicated by debates between 
physician witnesses over the existence of temporary insanity and moral insanity. To muddle the 
issue further, the court had reminded the jury that legal insanity was a question of law and fact 
and they were “not to be governed by the opinion of any medical expert.”179 In terms of the self-
defense claim, the jury might well believe that Sturla was a victim of repeated violence, but no 
one witnessed exactly what happened in the hotel room or who struck first. Trude made an 
appeal to the all-male jury to set a moral precedent with the case. By acting as protectors of 
virtue, they would send a message to rakes and libertines throughout Chicago who might 
otherwise be inclined to take advantage of a fallen angel under the assumption that there was no 
law to protect prostitutes, as Stiles had previously told Sturla. Their verdict would inform those 
men that “they are in error—that the misfortunes of the fallen woman does not place her beyond 
the pale of the law.”180 Trude implored the jury not to be prejudiced against the defendant on 
account of her nationality or surroundings, but instead to cross class lines and render a verdict 
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that would allow them to look their wives, daughters, and sweethearts in the face, knowing in 
their hearts that they had delivered moral justice. 
The rhetoric that had once been expressed by women for an evangelical Christian 
audience had now been used by an attorney in Chicago to persuade a group of men that they 
must act as moral arbiters and set an example for society. In her examination of the AFMRS, 
Lisa J. Shaver defines gendering as “women’s strategic use of societal gender distinctions 
assigned to them to garner ethos and assume power.”181 To borrow her terminology, Trude’s 
strategy of “gendering” the argument over virtue and vice might well have been the most 
important factor in the jury’s ultimate verdict. Trude effectively used gender distinctions 
assigned to nineteenth century women in order to incite sympathy and exonerate his client. In 
order for this strategy to work, the jury would need to be convinced that Sturla was not the siren 
of vice that that Mills made her out to be. 
Feminist scholar Sandra Lee Bartky has written that women must become aware of 
themselves as undeserving victims in society in order to develop a feminist consciousness.182 A 
century and a half before Bartky made this argument, female moral reformers developed a 
consciousness of victimization in order to propel their agenda. Reformers redefined traditional 
views of womanhood so as to stress the commonality of all women, enabling the movement to 
define the enemies of one class of women as the enemies of all women. With this logic, women 
who eventually became prostitutes had an intrinsic goodness and so could not possibly be truly 
evil. Trude’s observation that “no woman becomes a prostitute except through the agency of our 
sex” is remarkably reminiscent of an early issue of the AMR that asserted, “No woman ever 
voluntarily surrendered the blessings of a fair name. The sensitive plant shrinks not more 
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instinctively from the touch, than the nature of woman from defilement.”183 These 
pronouncements emanated from the middle-class concept that woman’s role largely arises from 
the purity of her spirit. By her very nature as a woman, Sturla was naturally morally superior to 
the man she murdered and thus innocent of her crime.184  
To illustrate his client’s purity, Trude reminded the jury of Frankie Weed, who had 
delivered one of the first testimonies they heard. Sturla met Weed three years before the trial 
when he was about twelve years old. Having become a “wanderer” in the wake of his father’s 
death and mother’s re-marriage, Weed was working as a newsboy and bootblack when he met 
Sturla. “With that attachment to children that has marked her life,” Trude told the jury, “She 
became interested in him” and took him on as her ward, providing him with clothing and sending 
him to school.185 In the short time since meeting Sturla, Weed had become a “respectable 
farmer,” “who but for this defendant would probably have been a thief.” This showed, Trude 
argued, that “when left alone and uncontrolled by any person, [Sturla’s] inclinations were in the 
direction of morality and purity of life, and above all, charity.”186 Despite Sturla being a young 
woman who had never had children, emphasizing her “attachment to children” and care for 
Weed would show the jury that she possessed piety and an innate motherly instinct, pillars of 
true womanhood.187 Trude concluded his closing speech by reminding the jury that Christmas 
was approaching and asked them to recall the savior’s sacred words “for imitation and example, 
and unite in saying to this no less unfortunate and stricken woman: ‘Go thou and sin no more.’” 
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According to the Chicago Daily News, Trude had barely finished speaking “when the great 
crowd in the court-room broke into an uproar of applause.”188 
Following Trude’s closing speech, state’s attorney L.L. Mills was given the last word. 
Tasked with refuting all of the defense’s claims regarding Sturla’s inherent virtue, Mills 
employed the standard courtroom technique of character assassination.189 Mills argued that much 
of the sentimentality expressed toward the defendant had no foundation in fact and accused the 
defense of magnifying her sufferings, warning the jury against “mistaken philanthropy and 
erroneous pity.”190 In an attempt to prove this point, Mills asked the jury to consider whether 
Sturla’s sufferings had been greater than any other woman endured: 
“Woman is the sufferer always. That is the nature of her physical organization. 
She is the burden-bearer. With her tender love she bears the griefs of man and 
children. The woman—honest, virtuous, good, who never broke a law, who slaves 
from early morning till midnight hour, who lives upon scanty fare, who takes care 
of her boys and girls—she is a sufferer too.”191 
Like his legal adversary in this trial, Mills employed an argument that centered on justice for the 
proper Victorian woman. This time, though, the woman who truly suffered was not she who was 
on trial, but rather the mother of the deceased. Mills begged the jury to empathize with Mrs. 
Stiles, who had been present in court throughout the trial, forced to sit just feet away from the 
harlot supposedly responsible for the “miserable, hurried, brutal death of her favorite child.”192 
Mills attempted to leverage the sanctity of motherhood in order to garner compassion from the 
jury, but the prosecutor may have ultimately spoiled his own argument when he also conceded to 
                                                
188 Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 220. 
189 Hobson, Uneasy Virtue, 73. 
190 Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 224. 
191 Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 225. 
192 Trial transcripts, as quoted in Turner, Sturla-Stiles Tragedy, 223. 
77 
Stiles’ libertinism. Within the bounds of true womanhood it was the responsibility of mothers to 
instill virtue in their children. Part of this was the expectation that mothers, not fathers, would 
supervise the sexual education of their sons.193 Charles Stiles’ shameless escapades would 
indicate that Mrs. Stiles had failed in her womanly duty to raise a respectable son.  
Not only were Sturla’s sufferings exaggerated by her attorney, Mills claimed, but so too 
was the extent to which she was a victim. He saw no reason to pity the “indicted harlot,” as she 
had voluntarily left her family in Baltimore to pursue a life of sin. Moreover, it was impossible to 
apply the same test of judgment to the mistress and her man as they might apply to a good man 
and good woman because there were “evident responsibilities, risks, dangers, perils in the 
relations of mistress and man that do not belong to wife and husband. She was in willing 
defiance of the rights of home, of morals, of law.”194 Implicit in the debate over whether Sturla 
had been seduced or that she had lured Stiles into her web of depravity was the understanding 
from both sides that her sexuality made her a problem. Sturla could have been the angel she was 
expected to be but her sexual desire from a young age made her a fallen angel and criminal, 
ultimately making the defendant’s sexuality a central issue in court.  
The belief that prostitutes were natural murderers had existed since at least 1836, when 
the editor of the New York Herald, James Bennett, reported on Helen Jewett’s murder. Bennett 
claimed it was not possible that Richard Robinson was the murderer and suggested it was more 
likely a woman was the killer. He wrote, “How could a young man perpetrate so brutal an act? Is 
it not more like the work of a woman? Are not the whole train of circumstances within the 
ingenuity of a female, abandoned and desperate?”195 The Jewett murder emphasizes the 
implication that in cases of fallen women slain, the true wickedness of the crime emanated from 
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the victim’s sexuality. The Sturla trial demonstrates this was also true when the fallen woman 
was standing trial herself. Karen Halttunen discusses the Gothic phenomenon of stories of sexual 
murder that shifted the focus from the “male murderer as monstrous moral alien to his female 
victim as a monstrous sexual alien.”196 In Sturla’s case, the prosecution and defense worked 
together to characterize her as a moral alien and sexual alien.  
In an argument directly countering the earlier claims made by the defense concerning the 
defendant’s womanhood, Sturla had betrayed her basic domestic and religious duties as a woman 
and therefore did not deserve the jury’s sympathy. Of course, the jury ultimately did show Sturla 
sympathy in the form of a manslaughter verdict that did not result in her execution, but only one 
year in prison. Even though she did not win a full acquittal, the jury decided the murderess had 
exhibited enough of the attributes expected of a respectable woman and that she deserved a 
chance at redemption. In reality, a murder conviction would have amounted to an admission that 
Sturla had succumbed to passion, therefore challenging the cultural standard of female 
passionlessness and its relation to moral superiority over men. In order to preserve the standard 
that allowed men to behave immorally with near impunity, the all male jury needed to validate 
the argument that Sturla’s passion emanated from her ethnicity and defective reproductive organs 
by absolving her of the crime. As scholars have already observed, there is an abundance of 
historical evidence that justice for women is in the hands of men whose desire is to maintain 
control of the social order. The Sturla trial is one of those pieces of evidence.197 
After the trial, any discussion of Sturla’s sanity was virtually nonexistent. Instead, the 
great many reports written about her during her time in prison centered on the question of 
whether, upon her release, she would change her ways and live a virtuous life or if she would 
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return to the fallen sisterhood and go back to her old life of sin and depravity. Once the verdict 
was read, it became clear that the public had mixed feelings regarding whether or not Sturla 
could or would reform. Chicago media outlets generally portrayed Sturla in a positive light, such 
as when a reporter from the Inter Ocean visited the prison on the Fourth of July, 1883. Sturla 
“was the most noticeable figure among the group” of thirty female convicts who celebrated the 
holiday on the prison grounds. Although she was dressed in a gingham gown like the rest of the 
prisoners, Sturla had “an appearance of neatness about her that was lacking with all the rest.” At 
the request of the prison matron, Theresa sang several songs for the group and “was loudly 
applauded for her efforts.”198  
Many Chicago reporters expected that with Mrs. Black’s help Sturla would find success 
on the stage upon her release, although some were seemingly convinced that it would be 
impossible for her to leave her old ways behind. One editorial argued that the “scarlet woman” 
intended to “put aside her well-meaning friends for old associates,” which proved that “all 
attempts to reform such characters are useless.”199 Media outlets outside of the city were even 
more critical of the Chicago murderess. The Detroit Free Press reported that Sturla had 
“simulated grief, agony and despair” in order to “fool the jury,” and admonished “idiot reporters” 
in Chicago for “gushing over murderers…and making heroes of hoodlums and brutes.”200 The St. 
Louis Post suggested that the only reason Sturla stood out among the “thousands of her class 
who are allowed to go down to the gutter unnoticed and uncared for,” was that she was “pretty 
enough to have made a newspaper sensation, and [had] rounded out a life of shame by killing her 
paramour in a moment of passion.” The author of this particular piece chastised Chicago’s idea 
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of philanthropy for believing members of the fallen sisterhood were entitled to sympathy if they 
were pretty and accused Sturla’s supporters of seeking personal notoriety in aligning with her. 
There are good women in St. Louis, the author wrote, “Who devote their lives to the relief of the 
fallen,” and do not “neglect the deserving to take part in a criminal sensation.”201 
The most extensive commentary on the Sturla case was O.E. Turner’s Sturla-Stiles 
Tragedy, published in 1883 while Sturla was still in prison. Following the trial account, Turner 
concluded the book with what amounts to a series of short essays discussing the various faults of 
society and their causes, casting the sensational events of the crime and trial as a Christian 
morality tale. He does not place blame on either party but rather on society itself. Turner 
explained that this tragedy embodies the sad truth that Chicago, “the great maelstrom of 
iniquity,” is a society that lacks Christ’s love. It is this “want of love that creates prostitutes, 
libertines, and paupers and…is the primal cause of all the misery of this world.”202 It was the 
“universal lack in the moral foundation of marriage” that made crime and licentiousness so 
abundant. Turner also declared that upper class fathers and mothers focused so much on profit 
and popularity that their sons became “social egotists and domestic tyrants,” while their 
daughters grew up with “enervated nerves and a weak will.”203 He posited that in order to instill 
proper morality, every woman should be educated and trained to appreciate the “excellence and 
power of womanly virtue and chastity.” Men needed lessons in self-purity and in being a friend 
and protector to women, “honoring her virtue as a woman and as the mother of his kind.”204 
According to Turner, Theresa Sturla embodied a woman whose craving for love compelled her 
actions. The “pleading aspirations of her better nature” indicated her desire to reach the “sweet 
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light of the purer and better life.”205 In the final pages of the book, Turner pondered what society 
could now do for Sturla, who displayed a true woman’s heart “capable of the deepest devotion 
and self-sacrifice,” showing that there was something worth redeeming.206 
At the dawn of the Progressive Era, Turner was calling for a complete reformation of 
Chicago society. The Sturla trial occurred at a historical moment when urban society, especially 
in Chicago, struggled to counter vice with virtue. Vice and prostitution was so entrenched in 
Chicago society that the Chicago Times referred to feeble containment efforts made by the 
municipal government as a “co-partnership of Chicago with harlotry.”207 The Chicago Daily 
News expressed fears that nothing could eliminate “the polluting presence of abandoned women 
who wandered through the streets.”208 If the events of Stiles’ murder had taken place just a 
decade or two earlier, it is less likely that the murderess would have been treated the same way 
by the public. For most of the century, it had been imperative to find the guilty woman in cases 
that involved fallen angels, even if she were the victim in the crime. By the 1880s, however, it 
was clear that many Chicagoans desired dramatic changes in the social order and prostitution 
was a central part of the conversation. 
Sturla-Stiles Tragedy could be viewed as a precursor to the much more famous book 
about Chicago’s social problems written a decade later, If Christ Came to Chicago!, by William 
T. Stead. Stead first visited Chicago in October 1893, arriving on the last day of the World’s 
Columbian Exposition. In stark contrast to the gleaming White City of the fair, Stead found 
himself in an American city that was struggling through an economic depression and faced the 
problem of widespread unemployment just before winter. After a few days in town and a visit to 
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the Levee district, Stead was disturbed to find a corrupt municipal government and welfare 
agencies that were either unable or unwilling to manage the massive numbers of unfortunate 
people who needed help. But he also saw a commendable reform movement that had been in 
development for several decades. Shortly before his trip, Stead wrote of his admiration for 
Frances Willard’s temperance work, predicting that Chicago might become “the centre of the 
English-Speaking Race, so far as Moral Reform is concerned.” However, he found that the 
burgeoning reform movement in Chicago was impeded by internal distrust and an inability to 
truly unify. Stead began working with reformers and published If Christ Came to Chicago! as a 
provocative exposé of Chicago’s corruption and underground economy in 1894, allegedly selling 
70,000 copies on its publication day.209 
Virtually all of the social problems addressed by Turner in Sturla-Stiles Tragedy are 
represented and expanded upon in Stead’s book, with an appendix featuring a color-coded map 
of the Levee district containing precise locations of brothels, saloons, and pawnbrokers. The 
fight for reform, especially as it pertained to prostitution, came to a head in 1910 when the 30 
member Chicago Vice Commission was formed and tasked with determining whether 
prostitution should be formally outlawed or remain a regulated business in segregated vice 
districts. In 1911, the commission published the findings of their research in a document entitled 
The Social Evil of Chicago. By the early twentieth century, prostitutes were often painted as 
innocent victims who should be viewed sympathetically. The Vice Commission lamented the 
plight of the prostitute: 
Against these powerful business interests, the liquor dealer, the house owner and 
his agents, the men who run the place, the furnisher of all sorts from butcher and 
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grocer to the dry goods houses and the supported men, against these stand the girl, 
usually young, feeble of will, unskilled as a worker, a lover of ease, perhaps first 
deceived, and always after a time the victim of liquor, “dope,” and other 
stimulants…It is obvious that the weaker factor, the girl, will be crushed in so 
unequal a conflict. On her falls the ignominy, the loss of health or social position 
and final physical and social death. While the men who profit from this vice, live 
on, sleek and prosperous—often so powerful in politics that even decent men dare 
not expose them.”210 
While their rhetoric echoes that of earlier moral reformers, the social reformers who made up 
urban vice commissions were no longer the aggravated, vocal women who put together the 
Advocate of Moral Reform in the 1830s. Dominating the movement at the turn of the century 
were male reformers who saw the prostitute as a threat to the social order.  
The changing attitudes toward prostitution reflect tensions brought on by rapid and 
dramatic changes in American society throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
including industrialization, commercialization, and urbanization. Progressive Era Chicagoans felt 
threatened by challenges to Victorian morality that these changes posed and looked to 
prostitution as the manifestation of traditional American society’s corruption. What reformers 
feared most was the way prostitution endangered conventional family life and values. Falling 
birth rates were blamed on sterility caused by venereal disease brought to the family by the evils 
of prostitution. The Chicago Vice Commission decreed, “A healthy woman living in wedlock all 
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of her child-bearing life, under favorable circumstances for natural procreation, should have a 
family of ten children.”211 
Reformers also blamed prostitution for the changing role of middle-class women. As 
prostitutes were traditionally some of the only women to enter the public arena, middle-class 
women who ventured outside the home for any reason blurred the line between the “lady” and 
prostitute. For panicked males who feared for their own place in society, prostitution signified 
the lawlessness of women moving into the public sphere, away from their designated roles as 
wife and mother.212 In a way, the prostitute came to represent the imminent downfall of 
traditional American society if it were not stopped. If the fallen women at the heart of the 
problem were not capable of redemption, then perhaps neither was Chicago society as a whole. 
 On its surface, the trial of Theresa Sturla was an issue of the defendant’s alleged insanity, 
and there is no doubt that such a sensational defense aroused a great interest in the case. 
However, analyzing the various interpretations of Sturla’s morality (or lack thereof) in and out of 
court reveals an unexpected truth about this case. In reality, the case was a crisis of class and 
morals that reflected the perceived dangers of changing social standards at the turn of the 
twentieth century. The morality of the defendant was fiercely debated before, during, and after 
the trial, and the same cannot be said for the issue of her insanity. The jury deemed her worthy of 
a chance at redemption, and the public watched and waited to see if the fallen woman really 
could move up the social ladder in the wake of committing a violent crime. Ultimately, Theresa 
Sturla sparked a larger discussion of the problems with society and her case became an example 
of the necessity for moral reformation in Chicago. 
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CONCLUSION 
 On Christmas Day, 1882, a journalist from the Chicago Tribune visited Sturla in the 
county jail where she awaited her transport to the state penitentiary in Joliet, reporting, “She was 
in the best of humor.” Sturla had been “submerged with Christmas presents,” including candies, 
figs, flowers, illuminated cards, and stationary, along with a pile of letters showing support and 
sympathetic thoughts. She told the reporter about her favorite gifts: those that had come from her 
mother and brother. From her prison cell, Sturla said, “I feel very happy today, for I have heard 
from my mother. Here is her letter, and here is one from my brother. They make me light-
hearted. This is the merriest Christmas I have known since I left home.” Upon being asked if 
Stiles had ever “had [her] by intention,” Sturla said that he had not and that she loved Stiles 
before and still loved him at that moment. 
My love for that man may be a weakness, but I cannot eradicate it. I see some of 
the papers try to make me out cold and heartless and artificial. God knows my 
greatest punishment was the consequence of my love for Charlie Stiles. He would 
be as tender as a sweetheart to me one moment and knock me down the next. I 
could endure his blows, but do you know what tortured me more than anything 
else? It was to have him bring men [to Watson’s] and then wait at the foot of the 
stairs until I could give him the money. That is what made me doubt his love. And 
yet he professed passionate regard for me and I was continually hearing from 
others of his remarks showing attachment for me. 
To this, the reporter replied, “Your passion for that man in view of his treatment of you is 
something I never could understand.”213 To a contemporary observer, it is apparent that what 
Sturla exhibited in this interview and others is a classic example of traumatic bonding, or a 
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strong emotional attachment between an abused person and his or her abuser, formed as a result 
of the cycle of violence.214 The reporter’s remarks, along with other comments from witnesses 
and both attorneys during the trial underscore the fact that any conceptual understanding of 
psychological trauma was many decades away. 
Theresa Sturla was released from Joliet State Penitentiary on Thanksgiving Day, 1883. 
The public had paid close attention to Sturla throughout her incarceration and, despite efforts on 
the part of prison staff to discreetly usher her back to the city, several hundred people waited at 
the Joliet train station to get a glimpse of the murderess whose trial had captivated audiences a 
year prior. The debate over Sturla’s character and morality waged on. The Tribune reported: 
“Grave doubts have been expressed as to which course she would take—reform or return to her 
evil ways.”215 
Chicagoans speculated greatly, waiting to see if Sturla would rejoin the demi-monde and 
return to Carrie Watson’s, or if she would go with Mrs. Black and the estimable “Christian 
ladies” who expressed interest in her reformation. Instead, Sturla quietly rejoined her family at 
their home on South Dallas Street in Baltimore. When she arrived, “her mother wept over 
her…and gave her wayward child a warm welcome back again.” The Sturlas lived in a poor 
section of the city, and a reporter remarked that her “silks and satins and fur cloak seem[ed] very 
much out of place on Dallas Street.” Madame Faye, operator of the brothel where Sturla worked 
as a teenager, allegedly offered the famous Chicago murderess her old position. Sturla turned 
down the proposal, telling a reporter, “I am not going back there, but I am to try to live a better 
life. We have got a little money and I can get along nicely here at home, though of course this 
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house is not like the ones I’ve lived in.” The Chicago reporter was apparently suspicious of 
Sturla’s claim, writing, “How long she will keep her good intentions remains to be seen.”216 
Media coverage of Sturla waned after her return to Baltimore. It was reported that, with 
the help of Mr. and Mrs. Black, she went to New York City in order to receive proper musical 
training and changed her name in an effort “not to be troubled by any of her former 
associates.”217 According to an interview with her brother, James Sturla, Theresa received a 
number of offers from professional managers and would likely sign on as a client of Freddie 
Gebhardt, a prominent and well-connected member of the New York upper class.218 
Unfortunately, Theresa Sturla is largely lost to history after this point in time and there is little 
that suggests she had any real success as a performer. However, she may have made it into 
Baltimore polite society, as indicated by a 1909 Baltimore Sun report that lists her name among 
several other women who were organizing philanthropic events in the city.219 Genealogical 
evidence suggests that Sturla married a man named Jerome Cella in 1901 and died in 1942, at the 
age of 81. She is buried alongside her parents at New Cathedral Cemetery in Baltimore. 
The trial of Theresa Sturla was a unique moment in the history of Chicago. The public 
devoured the story of “a man of the world slain by a woman of the town.” They soon learned, 
however, that this woman of the town was the true victim, having been habitually abused and 
mistreated by a supposedly respectable man. Because Stiles had betrayed the ideals of masculine 
respectability, Sturla largely gained the sympathy of the public before her trial began. The trial 
itself emphasizes the conflict between the Victorian medical and legal establishments, which 
ultimately allowed Sturla to become a sympathetic figure to the male jury, standing at the 
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intersection of competing discourses about crime and insanity. Finally, Sturla herself came to 
represent the moral crisis that would come to a head a few years later as Chicago became a 
center of Progressive Era reform efforts. The tragedy of Theresa Sturla illustrates that the ideal of 
true womanhood was not out of reach for a fallen woman, but the road to respectability for a 
woman like Sturla was paved in the blood of her abuser. 
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